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ON KAMISAR, KILLING, AND THE FUTURE 
OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH 
Norman L. Cantor* 
Tens - perhaps hundreds - of thousands of trees could have 
been spared over the last forty-five years had opponents of physician­
assisted death only been content to let Yale Kamisar be their exclusive 
spokesperson. Their movement would have lost no significant 
substance or persuasive force, for Kamisar's 1958 article - Some Non­
Religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy-Killing' Legislation1 -
presaged the shape and content of the subsequent forty-five year 
debate over legalizing physician-assisted death ("PAD" ).2 Kamisar's 
article preceded by years the development of a whole jurisprudence 
relating to the withholding/withdrawing of life-sustaining medical 
treatment ("LSMT") and the administration of pain-relief substances 
alleviating physical suffering while risking accelerated death. 3 That 
article demonstrated remarkable prescience and intellectual honesty 
while shaping the content of opposition to PAD. 
Kamisar continued to participate in the debate for decades 
thereafter,4 always exhibiting remarkable intellectual honesty and 
* Professor of Law and Justice Nathan L. Jacobs Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers 
University School of Law, Newark. B.A. 1964, Princeton; J.D. 1967, Columbia. - Ed. I am 
grateful to my colleague George Thomas III for his always astute assistance in writing about 
the relation between criminal law and the law of death and dying. Thanks also to Julie 
Newman for her very able research assistance, and to the Dean's Research Fund at Rutgers 
Law School for financial support. 
1. 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958) [hereinafter Kamisar, Non-Religious Views). 
2. Some sources carefully differentiate between assisted suicide and euthanasia on the 
basis that assisted suicide is less subject to abuse because the suicide herself rather than a 
physician performs the final lethal act. An emphasis on physician-assisted suicide surfaced 
primarily in the 1990s. Kamisar's 1958 piece preceded the shift in emphasis to assisted 
suicide, and he originally preferred the term physician-assisted death ("PAD") to cover both 
assisted suicide and euthanasia. I, too, will primarily refer to PAD because there are so many 
common issues touching assisted suicide and euthanasia. Where appropriate, I will refer 
specifically to physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") or voluntary active euthanasia ("V AE"). 
3. That jurisprudence is generally traced to In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). See 
generally Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-five Years after Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence 
of Death and Dying, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 182 (2001) [hereinafter Cantor, Twenty-five 
Years after Quinlan). 
4. Yale Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia: Why Keep the Distinction?, TRIAL, Mar. 
1993, at 32 [hereinafter Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia); Yale Kamisar, Against 
Assisted Suicide - Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735 (1995) 
[hereinafter Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide); Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted 
Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CENTER REP. , May-June 1993, at 32 [hereinafter 
Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?]; Yale Kamisar, On the 
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insight. Kamisar's special insights started with his prediction about the 
legal status of a physician's withholding of LSMT. Years before cases 
addressing this issue emerged, he correctly anticipated that a 
physician's failure to provide LSMT might be treated as homicide by 
omission in light of a physician's affirmative fiduciary duty to the 
patient.5 He also foresaw that the fiduciary obligation would not 
rigidly dictate maintenance of medical life support in the face of a 
competent patient's request to withhold or withdraw LSMT. Later, he 
correctly forecast that the Supreme Court would refuse to find 
assistance in suicide to be a fundamental liberty and would instead 
leave regulation of physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") to the states.6 
Kamisar established his unwavering honesty with his 1 958 
concession that PAD could be morally correct. He boldly stated that 
he would "hate to have to argue" the moral case against PAD for an 
irremediably stricken patient suffering intolerably and expressing a 
fixed and considered desire to die.7 Kamisar also conceded that a 
physician's cooperation with a patient's rejection of LSMT was 
morally equivalent to PAD, at least where the cooperating physician 
intended to bring about death. For him, no moral difference existed 
between pulling a plug and providing a poison or giving a fatal 
injection. "As a matter of logic," he wrote, the analogy between PAD 
and ending LSMT was appealing.8 He believed that neither form of 
hastening death - withdrawal of LSMT or PAD - was intrinsically 
immoral.9 (All this doesn't mean that Kamisar thought that the legal 
Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MINN. L. REV. 895 (1998) 
[hereinafter Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact]; Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: 
ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 225 (John Keown ed., 1995) [hereinafter 
Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge]; Yale Kamisar, Physician Assisted Suicide: The Problems 
Presented by the Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121 
(1998) [hereinafter Kamisar, PAS: The Problems Presented] ; Yale Kamisar, The Reasons So 
Many People Support Physician-Assisted Suicide - And Why These Reasons Are Not 
Convincing, 12 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 113 (1996) [hereinafter Kamisar, The Reasons So Many 
People Support PAS] ; Yale Kamisar, The 'Right to Die': On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 
DUQ. L. REV. 481 (1996) [hereinafter Kamisar, The 'Right to Die']; Yale Kamisar, The Rise 
and Fall of the 'Right' to Assisted Suicide, in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE, 69 
(Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002) [hereinafter Kamisar, The Rise and Fall of the 
'Right' to Assisted Suicide]; Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? 
When is There No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203 (1991). 
5. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1,  at 982-83 n.41. 
6. Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support PAS, supra note 4, at 124-25. 
7. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 975. 
8. Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, supra note 4, at 35 
(emphasis in original). 
9. E.g. , Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia, supra note 4, at 35. He agreed with 
Joseph Fletcher that " '[a] deliberate act of omission, when death is the goal . . .  is morally 
the same [as] a deliberate act of commission.' " Id. at 36 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Joseph Fletcher, Remarks at the Seventh Annual Euthanasia Conference (Dec. 7, 1974), at 
5, 8). 
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handling of PAD and removal of LSMT ought to be identical. His 
ultimate position will be examined in more detail below in the section 
on "Killing versus Letting Die"). 
Kamisar was also appropriately skeptical about hinging legal 
prohibition on a physician's state of mind or specific intent in the 
context of end-of-life decisionmaking.1 0  He observed that a physician­
actor's motives run a gamut, are sometimes mixed, and are almost 
always difficult to identify.11 (He could not have anticipated that some 
later commentators would try to distinguish medical practices like 
removal of life support and administration of potentially fatal 
analgesics from PAD primarily on the basis of physicians' intentions). 
That skepticism about specific intent later helped him resolve for 
himself the tension between PAD and administration of risky 
analgesics.12 
Kamisar showed remarkable prescience in identifying the 
"practical issues" that would ultimately form the crux of the dispute 
over legalization of PAD. For him, the benefit of PAD was 
expeditious relief from prolonged suffering.1 3 That important benefit, 
however, had to be considered together with several other factors. The 
need for PAD depended on availability of alternative means of 
mitigating suffering like palliative or analgesic techniques as well as 
alternative legal means to hasten the death of a suffering patient.14 The 
possible benefits of PAD had to be weighed against certain "utilitarian 
obstacles"15 - abuse of vulnerable patients in the administration of 
PAD and unsavory extensions of PAD beyond the realm of voluntary 
active euthanasia of competent patients nearing the end of a painful 
dying process. These predicted abuses would take the form of 
"unwilling or manipulated death[s] of the most vulnerable members of 
society."16 Some abuse would flow from medical mistake in diagnosis 
or mistake in assessing the competence of patients seeking PAD. 
Kamisar wondered how stricken patients facing terrible stress, pain, or 
effects of narcotic analgesics could possibly make careful, considered 
judgments about PAD.17 Clinicians might also needlessly make PAD 
10. Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge, supra note 4, at 255-56 n.80. 
1 1 .  Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 980. 
12. See infra notes 217-219 and accompanying text. 
13. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 1008. 
14. Id. at 1005-07. He noted the emergence of palliative medicine and the fact that 
competent persons are normally able to commit suicide without legal penalty. Id. at 1009-1 1 .  
15. Id. at 974. 
16. Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support PAS, supra note 4, at 116 (quoting 
Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the 
Right to Die, 44 AM U. L. REV. 803, 807 (1995)). 
17. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 976-77, 985-87. 
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an attractive option by failing to perceive treatable depression or by 
under-treating pain.18 Stricken patients would be susceptible to subtle 
pressures that might coerce them into agreeing to PAD. Those 
pressures might come from surrounding family facing the emotional 
and financial burdens of a deathwatch or from health-care providers 
burdened with caretaking tasks.19 Or the patient's own consciousness 
of surrounding people bearing burdens of caretaking might generate 
pressure to seek PAD.20 
Another hazard troubled Kamisar from the start: his conviction 
that legalization of voluntary PAD would inexorably result in 
unsavory extensions. Proponents of euthanasia (as well as later 
proponents of PAS) pushed only for legalization of PAD for 
competent patients facing a terminal illness. Kamisar perceived these 
ostensibly limited objectives as a strategic move to cultivate public 
opinion and insert a legal wedge leading to further extensions.21 He 
was most wary of a slippery slope leading to nonvoluntary euthanasia, 
remarking in 1958: "Miss Voluntary Euthanasia is not likely to be 
going it alone for very long."22 He recounted the horrific progression 
of what the Nazis had deemed mercy killing and recounted how some 
American proponents of euthanasia had wanted to euthanize mentally 
disabled persons and other "social detritus."23 He worried about the 
medical fate of " 'the drooling, helpless, disoriented old man or the 
doubly incontinent old woman lying log-like in bed.' "24 Kamisar 
concluded that, on balance, the potential abuses of voluntary PAD 
combined with extensions to "far more objectionable practices," 
outweighed the utility of PAD in relieving the suffering of some 
patients who genuinely did want to die.25 
Kamisar's 1 958 article, Some Non-Religious Views, has had an 
amazing impact over the last forty-five years. It may not have been 
cited as often as the classic article by Warren and Brandeis on the right 
to privacy,26 but it was probably more successful in accomplishing its 
18. Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge, supra note 4, at 243; Kamisar, PAS: The Problems 
Presented, supra note 4, at 1 132; Yale Kamisar, An Unraveling of Morality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
5, 1991, at A25. 
19. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 990. 
20. Id. at 990-91.  Later, this possibility of altruistic or guilty impulses prompting choice 
of PAD became known as creation of a duty to die - patient perception of choosing death 
as "the 'right' thing to do." Kamisar, PAS: The Problems Presented, supra note 4, at 1 134-35. 
21 .  Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 1016-17. 
22. Id. at 1031 .  
23. Id. at 1019, 1031-35. 
24. Id. at 1026 (quoting Banks, Euthanasia, 26 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 297, 305 (1950)). 
25. Id. at 1042. 
26. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890) (generally considered the most cited law review article ever). 
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objectives.27 Kamisar's article, with its emphasis on "utilitarian 
obstacles" to PAD, has not only framed the discourse over the last 
forty-five years, but also successfully influenced the outcome of the 
debate. Subsequent commentators have followed Kamisar's format by 
focusing on the practical consequences of legalization rather than 
intrinsic immorality.28 The New York State Task Force on Life and the 
Law, probably the most comprehensive examination of PAD ever 
done, relied on the consequentialist arguments first articulated by 
Kamisar.29 Successful opponents of state voter initiatives to legalize 
PAD have uniformly focused on the asserted hazards of abuse and 
lack of procedural safeguards. 30 
The impact of Yale Kamisar's opposition to PAD is undisputable. 
The harder question is whether, in light of post-1958 developments, 
Kamisar pushed in the right direction. Kamisar's initial posture 
preceded a number of developments: a) new and improved medical 
technologies capable of sustaining lives well beyond the point that 
many people would desire; b) evolution of jurisprudence and medical 
ethics governing the withholding and withdrawal of LSMT; c) 
sophisticated palliative care techniques, especially drugs capable of 
both mitigating pain and hastening death; d) a shift in typical causes of 
death from virulent diseases to slower, progressive conditions carrying 
the prospect of lingering in a gravely debilitated state; e) changes in 
the nature and financing of the doctor-patient relationship away from 
a long-term relationship rendered on a fee-for-service basis and 
toward managed care carrying disincentives for expensive medical 
interventions; and f) acceptance of voluntary euthanasia or assisted 
suicide in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Oregon. Those developments prompt this reexamination of PAD 
27. The Warren-Brandeis article, with its emphasis on private control over public image 
and the insulation of personal life from public view, found a more responsive audience in 
Europe than it did in America. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of 
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 1 13 YALE L.J. 1 151 (2004). Whitman asserts that the right to 
privacy as envisioned by Warren and Brandeis "amounts to little in American practice 
today." Id. at 1204. 
28. E.g. , Felicia Cohn & Joanne Lynn, Vulnerable People: Practical Rejoinders to Claims 
in Favor of Assisted Suicide, in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUIODE 238 (Kathleen Foley 
& Herbert Hendin eds., 2002); Carl H. Coleman, The New York State Task Force on Life and 
the Law: Why It Concluded Physician-Assisted Suicide Should Not be Legalized, 12 ST. 
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 647, 650-51 (1997); Robert I. Misbin, Physicians' Aid in Dying, 
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1307, 1309 (1991). Other commentators, including John Arras, Dan 
Callahan, and David Pratt have opposed legalization of PAD primarily because of the 
hazards of abuse. 
29. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH JS SOUGHT: 
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 1 17-48 (1994). 
30. This was true in California, Washington, Michigan, and Maine where the initiatives 
lost, as well as in Oregon where the initiative got voter approval. David J. Mayo & Martin 
Gunderson, Vita/ism Revitalized: Vulnerable Populations, Prejudice, and Physician-Assisted 
Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jul-Aug. 2002, at 14, 15. 
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forty-five years after Kamisar's landmark piece. I will argue that, while 
prohibitions on PAS and voluntary euthanasia ostensibly prevail, a 
variety of lawful means of hastening death exist that render the legal 
prohibitions of PAD anomalous. 
Part I considers the theoretical tensions between the prevailing ban 
on PAD and the jurisprudence authorizing rejection of life support 
and administration of risky analgesics. How sound is the prevailing 
distinction between killing and letting die? And how convincing is the 
claim that any benefit from PAD would be outweighed by 
accompanying risks of abuse? Part II reflects on the ultimate bounds 
of legalization of PAD. Are the envisioned extensions of voluntary 
patient choice inevitable and, if so, are they as objectionable as 
portrayed? Finally, Part III reexamines opposition to any legalization 
of PAD in the light of existing lawful means of hastening death. I 
argue that existing commentary on PAD misconceives the moving 
force behind the legalization movement as compassion (relief of 
suffering) rather than provision of medical handling that allows fatally 
afflicted people to preserve their personal visions of a dignified death. 
Autonomy, constructive preference,31 and dignity are the crucial 
objects. And those objects point to avoidance of a lingering, severely 
debilitated dying process as patients' primary concern. 
Kamisar's position opposing PAS and V AE may hold up as a 
matter of legal formality. Ironically, that is so only because law and 
medical mores have found ways to circumvent those prohibitions and 
to allow various means of hastening death. American law and culture 
have in essence accepted various forms of physician-assisted suicide or 
euthanasia and perhaps it is time to acknowledge that fact. 
I. ON KILLING VERSUS LETIING DIE 
The prevailing legal framework in the United States differentiates 
sharply between physician conduct withdrawing LSMT (thereby 
prompting death) and conduct providing or administering a lethal 
substance. The patient's voluntary rejection of treatment in the former 
makes the physician's conduct legal, while the voluntary request to 
hasten death in the latter fails to legalize the physician's conduct.3 2 
This sharp differentiation dates to the cases from the 1960s and 1970s 
upholding a competent patient's prerogative to reject LSMT. Those 
cases insisted that doctors implementing a patient's rejection of LSMT 
31. Constructive preference refers to an effort to project what a now-incompetent 
medical patient would want done in the circumstances now being faced. That approach is 
applicable to formerly competent persons who have not left clear-cut instructions regarding 
their own end-of-life medical choices. See infra notes 183-184 and accompanying text. 
32 See Norman L. Cantor, Glucksberg, The Putative Right to Adequate Pain Relief, and 
Death with Dignity, 34 J. HEALTH L. 301, 305-07 (2001) [hereinafter Cantor, Glucksberg]. 
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were not assisting suicide or performing euthanasia. 33 Rather, they 
were respecting the patient's self-determination and bodily integrity. 
Accordingly, withdrawal of LSMT merely allowed a natural dying 
process to occur while administration of a lethal substance precipitated 
death by unnatural means and constituted unlawful killing. Does the 
dichotomy hold up? Are there good reasons to honor a stricken 
patient's request to remove life support but not to receive a lethal 
substance? 
A. State of Mind 
One explanation for distinguishing removal of life support relies on 
the physician actor's purported state of mind when removing the 
LSMT. This explanation draws a normative line between intentionally 
killing another and merely discontinuing care.34 According to this 
version, in the context of LSMT the cooperating physician's "intent is 
not to bring about the patient's death but to respect the patient's 
wishes not to be subjected to undesired treatment. "35 The 
accompanying assumption is that PAD inevitably entails a specific 
intention by the cooperating physician to bring about death. In 1997, 
five members of the Supreme Court accepted this distinction in 
rejecting physicians' and patients' claims that the different legal 
treatment of removal of LSMT and physician-assisted suicide was 
arbitrary. The opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the state-of­
mind distinction as one reason to deem the divergent legal treatment 
rational.36 He insisted that in removing LSMT the physician intends 
only to respect the patient's wishes or to cease doing degrading things 
to the patient while in providing a poison the physician "indubitably " 
intends primarily to make the patient dead. 37 
While comprehensible, the state-of-mind distinction is misguided 
because it largely does not reflect reality. Though some fatally stricken 
patients reject LSMT simply in order to avoid a burdensome medical 
intervention (e.g., dialysis) and thus have no intent to die, many others 
do intend to end their existence. These dying patients have 
33. E.g. , Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Superintendent of 
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977). 
34. LEON KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY 207-08 (2002). 
35. Cohn & Lynn, supra note 28, at 247. Note that the patient's own intention is 
assumed to be avoidance of burdensome treatment rather than a wish to die. The patient's 
wishes are relevant to understanding the physician's reasons for cooperating with the patient. 
36. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
37. Id. at 802. The Chief Justice's statement is a close paraphrase of Leon Kass's 
position as articulated in Leon R. Kass, '/ Will Give No Deadly Drug': Why Doctors Must 
Not Kill, in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE 17, 37 (Kathleen Foley & Herbert 
Hendin eds., 2002). 
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deteriorated to an intolerable level (e.g., last stages of ALS or AIDS) 
and their rejection of LSMT is made with the intention of precipitating 
death.38 Their object is "to allow death to occur, to end an existence 
that no longer benefits the patient."39 These patients have a suicidal 
state of mind - a specific wish to die - when they reject LSMT. This 
is perhaps most obvious when patients reject mostly painless artificial 
nutrition and hydration ("ANH "); they are certain to die and are not 
seeking to avoid any burdensome discomforts associated with the 
ANH treatment they cease.40 
A physician's cooperation with a suffering patient's rejection of 
LSMT with the intent to die accounts for the common references to 
withholding or withdrawing of life support as voluntary "passive 
euthanasia. "41 It is deemed passive because the patient is seeking relief 
from suffering not by means of a poison or injection, but rather by 
removal of life support. And it is euthanasia because, while some 
cooperating physicians may only be respecting the patient's 
prerogative to resist treatment, many others in removing LSMT share 
the patient's object to hasten death.42 "Compassionate critical care 
clinicians may often wish that death would come quickly in the setting 
of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatments for the sake 
of patients and their families .... "43 Take withdrawal of ANH. As one 
commentator asks: "Why else, in practice, is a doctor likely to 
withhold/withdraw tube-feeding from a patient whose life he thinks is 
no longer a benefit [to the patient] except in order to put an end to 
that life? "44 While some such physicians may be respecting their 
38. Such a patient's motive for seeking death may vary. Emotional suffering, intolerable 
indignity, or desire to spare loved ones' additional burdens are all plausible motives. The 
point is that a patient rejecting LSMT often seeks death and wants to die. 
39. Alexander Morgan Capron, Death and the Court, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.· 
Oct. 1997, at 27-28. "[M]any patients who want treatment discontinued know that they will 
die without it and . . .  clearly express a desire to end their suffering [by dying]." Note, 
Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 
2030 (1992). 
40. For confirmation that death by dehydration need not be a painful or burdensome 
process, see infra notes 204-212 and accompanying text. 
41. JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 215 (2002). Pope John 
Paul II calls withholding of ANH "euthanasia by omission." See Woods v. Kentucky, No. 
1999-SC-0773-DG, slip op. at 26 (Ky. Aug. 26, 2004) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). 
42. Yale Kamisar, The Right to Die?, L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Fall 1988, at 7; Allen 
Buchanan, Intending Death: The Strucutre of the Problem and Proposed Solutions, in 
INTENDING DEATH 28-30 (T. Beauchamp ed., 1996). 
43. Graeme M. Rocker & J. Randall Curtis, Caring for the Dying in the Intensive Care 
Unit, 290 JAMA 820, 821 (2002). 
44. KEOWN, supra note 41, at 247. Removal of life support from a permanently 
unconscious patient most clearly denotes intent to hasten death. There, the physician cannot 
be withdrawing a burdensome mode of treatment from a patient (though in theory the 
physician actor might only be respecting the patient's previously articulated wishes). 
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patients' wishes without embracing their objects to die, and others 
might be seeking to avoid a burdensome treatment (as where ANH 
might prompt aspiration pneumonia), many physicians intend to 
hasten their patients' deaths.4 5 Data from the Netherlands support the 
thesis that physicians removing life support often do so with this 
specific intention.46 
Yale Kamisar, with characteristic intellectual honesty, always 
acknowledged that many removals of life support occur with the 
intention by both patient and physician of hastening death. He had 
always been "greatly troubled" by social willingness to accept this 
form of passive euthanasia,47 for he understood the theoretical tension 
between legal authorization of removal of life support with intent to 
cause the patient's death and banning PAD.4 8 He could not accept the 
notion that the patient lacked specific intent to die or that the 
physician only wanted to avoid burdensome treatment - especially in 
the context of cases where the patient's condition had stabilized and 
life support was being removed solely because the patient sought to 
die.49 Kamisar had always been suspicious of having legality depend on 
the specific intent of a physician because he understood the frequent 
presence of mixed intentions and the difficulty of discerning actual 
intention in the context of end-of-life medical intervention.50 He 
accepted the fact that passive euthanasia had become a fait accompli 
in modem medicine and only sought to confine euthanasia to those 
narrow bounds.51 In other words, although Kamisar supported the 
distinction Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to draw, he rejected the 
court's rationale that physicians who remove life support do not intend 
to hasten death. 
The converse claim on which Rehnquist also depends - that 
physicians participating in PAD always intend to cause death - is also 
faulty, though not as obviously so. Alternative states of mind might 
accompany a physician's participation in PAD. Where intolerable 
45. Douglas 0. Linder, The Other Right-to-Life Debate: When Does Fourteenth 
Amendment 'Life' End?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1183, 1202 (1995) ("Withdrawal of food and 
hydration . . .  is an action aimed at death in a way that is not unlike the administration of a 
lethal injection."). 
46. Henk Jochemsen, Dutch Court Decisions on Nonvoluntary Euthanasia Critically 
Reviewed, 13 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 447, 450 (1998) (reporting on a 1995 study indicating that 
about 10% of deaths in the Netherlands resulted from removal of LSMT with the intention 
to hasten death); see also KEOWN, supra note 41, at 129 (claiming that two-thirds of Dutch 
physicians' withdrawals of LSMT have the specific purpose of hastening death). 
47. Kamisar, The 'Right to Die, ' supra note 4, at 491. 
48. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
49. Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge, supra note 4, at 244, 255 n.80; see supra note 7 and 
accompanying text. 
50. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 980. 
51 .  Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge, supra note 4, at 244. 
1802 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:1793 
suffering, for example, prompts a patient's request for euthanasia or 
assistance in suicide, a cooperating physician might only intend to 
relieve suffering. David Orentlicher claims: "A lethal dose of a drug is 
prescribed not to kill the patient but to relieve the patient's 
suffering. "5 2  Thus, the intention only to relieve suffering (without 
seeking death) is at least possible. The likelihood is that the 
physician's intentions are mixed, for if death is the only way to relieve 
suffering it seems natural for the physician both to want to relieve 
suffering and to want the patient to die as quickly as possible. Some 
commentators also contend that doctors administering large doses of 
painkillers, knowing that the substances will cause death, may still only 
be intending to relieve suffering.53 A physician's large morphine dose 
may be delivered with the desire to provide permanent relief (by 
hastening death). 
Even a physician who prescribes a poison might not intend to 
shorten the life of a dying patient. By providing a poisonous substance, 
the physician may intend to give the patient control over her time of 
death and thereby relieve the patient's anxiety about unavoidably 
dying in intolerable pain. Such a physician would provide the lethal 
substance with the hope and intention that the patient would never use 
it. Indeed, George Annas has claimed that assisted suicide is legal so 
long as the physician supplying a lethal substance hopes that the 
patient won't use it.54 
In short, the attempt to distinguish LSMT from PAD on the basis 
of the physician-actor's state-of-mind fails. Some withdrawals of 
treatment are performed with the intention of bringing about death. 
Conversely, some physician actions terminating a patient's life may be 
accompanied by an intent to end suffering rather than an intent to end 
life. Because of the largely indeterminate physician state of mind in 
these contexts (such as administration of risky analgesics),55 the 
President's Commission in 1983 noted the "substantial potential for 
52. David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 663, 664 (1996). As noted, Kamisar saw practical reasons for banning PAD. See supra 
notes 13-16 and accompanying text; infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
53. KASS, supra note 37, at 37; see infra notes 220-222 and accompanying text. 
54. George J. Annas, The Bell Tolls for a Constitutional Right to Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1098, 1101 (1997). I doubt that the avoidance of assisted 
suicide prohibitions can be so simple. A prosecutor might still seek to prove intention to 
assist a suicide, or the physician might be accused of reckless conduct in violation of 
professional standards. 
55. Part of good palliative medical care is the provision of opioid analgesics that may 
risk hastening death. This active medical intervention hastening death evokes the image of 
euthanasia. Some commentators rely on the treating physician's state of mind to explain a 
distinction. That is a distinction that I discredit. See infra notes 220-224 and accompanying 
text. 
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unclear or contested determinations" and concluded that making state 
of mind the key determinant "does not help."56 
B. Letting Nature Take Its Course 
Popular wisdom claims (and courts sometimes agree) that there's 
an important difference between PAD, which involves active 
intervention to hasten death, and removal of life support, which 
involves letting a natural disease process run its course. For example, 
the Michigan Supreme Court commented, in rejecting a constitutional 
challenge to the state's ban on physician-assisted suicide: "There is a 
difference between choosing a natural death summoned by an 
uninvited illness . . .  and deliberately seeking to terminate one's life by 
resorting to death-inducing measures . . . .  "57 As we've just seen, the 
difference cannot simply be the patient's or the physician-actor's state 
of mind. So if both forms of causing death occur in the context of a 
competent dying patient who seeks relief in death, what real difference 
does it make whether PAD or removal of life support is used? 
Yale Kamisar has never found any major distinction between PAD 
and LSMT. He does not dispute Joseph Fletcher's assertion that "[a] 
deliberate act of omission, when death is the goal . . .  is morally the 
same [as] a deliberate act of commission."58 For Kamisar, the 
differential legal treatment of PAD and LSMT is "neither perfectly 
neat nor perfectly logical."59 Yet, he strongly favors continuation of 
the current legal framework. He regards the differential legal 
treatment as "a cultural and pragmatic compromise" between a 
societal desire to respect the wishes of seriously ill people seeking 
relief and a need to protect weak and vulnerable afflicted people.60 
(Recall that Kamisar's 1958 antipathy toward PAD was primarily 
grounded on "pragmatic" apprehensions about abuses that would flow 
from legalization of PAD.) He also perceives that medical practice has 
institutionalized the PAD/LSMT distinction.6 1 
56. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & 
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT 78-82 (1983). 
57. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728-29 (Mich. 1994); see also Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 49 F.3d 586, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1995) (asserting a moral distinction between letting 
a patient die and taking a life via a poison). 
58. Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia, supra note 4, at 36 (quoting Joseph Fletcher, 
Remarks at the Seventh Annual Euthenasia Conference (Dec. 7, 1974), at 5, 8) . 
59. Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support PAS, supra note 4, at 127. 
60. Id. at 128. 
61. "The distinction between managing medical intervention and resorting to external 
death-causing agents has become an integral part of the medico-legal landscape." Yale 
Kamisar, Law, Morality and Death, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 3, 1992, at 6. 
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Others seek more theoretical rationales than Kamisar's practical 
accommodation. Causation in fact is sometimes cited as the 
explanation for the different legal status of PAD and rejection of 
LSMT. The contention is that when a physician allows nature to take 
its course the underlying disease process is the proximate cause of 
death but when active conduct such as a lethal injection accelerates 
death, physician action is the proximate cause.6 2 This explanation is 
unconvincing. It's true that when LSMT is withheld or withdrawn one 
cause in fact of death is the underlying disease process. When a 
physician removes LSMT that was capable of sustaining the patient's 
life, however, the physician is also hastening death and the physician 
conduct will be considered the proximate cause of death depending on 
whether his or her conduct is legally justified. Suppose a physician 
disconnects a respirator without the consent of a competent patient 
and thereby precipitates the patient's untimely death. Without 
question, the physician's conduct removing LSMT is a proximate 
cause of death (even though the underlying pulmonary condition is the 
natural cause of death), and the physician is guilty of homicide. It is 
only the legal judgment that the physician has no duty to continue life 
support that alters the physician's legal responsibility for a killing, not 
the matter of causation.63 The same is true of withholding critical life 
support. If the physician has a professional and legal responsibility to 
provide LSMT, a physician's unjustified withholding of care can also 
constitute an unlawful killing. Causation does not provide a helpful 
distinction here. 
An act versus omission distinction might be asserted to explain the 
different treatment of PAD and removal of LSMT. But the notion that 
an act is more culpable than an omission fails in the context of end-of­
life medical handling. First, as just noted, a physician may have a 
professional and legal responsibility to initiate treatment and may be 
guilty of homicide by omitting treatment. Second, withdrawal of life 
support at a patient's request (now treated legally as an omission) is 
unquestionably an action by a physician precipitating death. That 
action could have been treated as an unlawful killing. American law 
determined to treat that conduct as a lawful omission in order to 
respect a patient's autonomy and bodily integrity in the face of life­
threatening afflictions.64 Otherwise, physicians would have been 
deterred from initiating life support because of fear that the patient's 
62 E.g., Cohn & Lynn, supra note 28, at 247. 
63. Yale Kamisar has always found "unpersuasive" the attempt to say that death is 
caused by natural causes when a physician removes life support and hastens an actual death. 
Kamisar, The 'Right to Die,' supra note 4, at 491. 
64. See Linda Edmondson, A Good Death in Oklahoma, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 939, 
942 (2002); Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver, Distinguishing Between Active and Passive 
Euthanasia, CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MED., Feb. 1986, at 32. 
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condition would still deteriorate, locking the patient into an unwanted 
limbo.65 In the context of end-of-life medical treatment, an active 
intervention resulting in death and a passive omission can be equally 
culpable or innocent.66 
Another effort to justify special legal tolerance of rejection of 
LSMT hinges on the individual's interest in bodily integrity. Writing 
for the majority in a 1997 assisted-suicide case, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist emphasized the role of bodily integrity in accounting for 
the different legal treatment of PAD and LSMT.67 He claimed that a 
patient's rejection of bodily intrusion - rather than a patient's 
prerogative to choose the manner and timing of death - was the key 
aspect of liberty that had been enshrined in the doctrine of informed 
consent and in the Court's respect for rejection of LSMT.68 By 
contrast, he implicitly claimed PAD involves an active introduction of 
substances into the body, a patient interest that is supposedly less 
venerable and robust. That claim - that a patient's right is a negative 
right against bodily intrusion - seems misguided. First, the cases 
establishing a patient's right to reject LSMT were grounded as much in 
respect for autonomy (in how to respond to a medical affliction) as 
bodily integrity.69 Second, common sense indicates that the key 
element accounting for a patient's right to reject LSMT is autonomy in 
how to respond to a fatal affliction rather than just control over bodily 
intrusions. Try a thought experiment. Suppose that a dying patient 
who has deteriorated to an intolerably undignified state could be kept 
alive by a medical treatment that involved no bodily intrusion - say 
by a magic extra-corporeal machine that emitted waves neither 
penetrating the body nor even noticeable to the patient. Does anyone 
doubt that the patient would be entitled to reject the magic machine? 
And wouldn't it be the patient's autonomy interest in choosing how to 
respond to a fatal affliction that accounted for the patient's 
65. Without a prerogative to withdraw life support, health care providers would be 
compelled to pump gases and liquids into moribund patients who did not want further 
medical intervention. 
66. The fact that omission and commission can be equally culpable prompts John 
Keown to label legal acceptance of rejection of LSMT (even in instances when the patient 
seeks death) as '"morally and intellectually misshapen'." For him, such physician conduct 
constitutes assistance to suicide and should not be legally tolerated. KEOWN, supra note 41, 
at 236-37. Keown suggests a "radical inconsistency" when law prohibits voluntary active 
euthanasia while permitting "intentional killing by omission." Id. at 233. 
67. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
68. Id. at 725. 
69. "Society recognizes a right to be free of unwanted physical intrusions because of the 
importance of self-determination and control over one's body." Orentlicher, supra note 52, at 
664 (emphasis added). 
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prerogative?70 In other words, the fact that letting nature take its 
course entails an avoidance of bodily intrusions does not account for 
the disparate treatment of PAD and withdrawal of LSMT. 
So far, no convincing theoretical rationale supports the legal 
distinction between PAD and "letting nature take its course" by 
withdrawing LSMT. A possible rationale is to view the prohibition of 
PAD as a symbolic social statement underscoring the sanctity of 
human life. Perhaps the prohibition reminds the citizenry that there is 
"something shocking in deliberately killing any human being."7 1 From 
this perspective, the fact that a patient dies from a natural pathology 
when LSMT is removed seems to constitute an important difference 
from actions that independently cause death. Thus, American 
physicians have always assumed that active euthanasia is murder - on 
the basis that respect for the sanctity of life precludes the taking of 
human life.72 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada cited 
"maintaining respect for human life" as the value that warrants a 
continued ban on PAD.73 Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted that states 
are entitled to assert an " 'unqualified interest in the preservation of 
human life.' "74 
Our societal ban on virtually all active killing does underscore the 
importance of human life. Exceptions to the ban are few - self­
defense, defense of others, capital punishment, and just war. Western 
society has generally criminalized mercy killing; the object of relieving 
suffering has never been deemed a sufficient justification for assistance 
to suicide or for voluntary active euthanasia.75 Although attempting 
suicide is no longer punished, the Model Penal Code criminalizes 
assistance to suicide on the ground that willing participation in taking 
the life of another offends the societal interest in the sanctity of life.76 
70. Physicians acknowledge that self-determination underpins a patient's right to refuse 
LSMT. See Edwin P. Maynard et al., Am. Coll. of Physicians, American College of Physicians 
Ethics Manual, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 947, 952 (1992). 
71. PETER BYRNE, PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MENTAL HANDICAP 
81 (2000). 
72. Shai Lavi, Euthanasia and the Changing Ethics of the Deathbed, 4 THEORETICAL 
lNQ. L. 729, 754 (July 2003), at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol4/iss2/art10. However, 
many contemporary physicians regard physician-assisted suicide as a final act of palliative 
care consistent with physicians' responsibility to relieve suffering. E.g., Steve Heilig et al., 
Physician-Hastened Death, 166 W. J. MED. 370, 371 (1997). 
73. Danuta Mendelson & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, A Comparative Study of the Law of 
Palliative Care and End-of-Life Treatment, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 130, 132 (2003). 
74. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1997)). 
75. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE LA w OF CRIME §§ 422, 447 (1946); Lavi, supra note 72, 
at 754. 
76. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.5 cmt. 5 (1980). 
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Thus, the ban on PAD could serve as a symbolic message about the 
sanctity of life. 
The theory of a symbolic message underlying the ban on PAD may 
be sound, but the force of that symbolic communication is rather 
flimsy. Courts and legislatures chose to regard withdrawal of LSMT as 
tantamount to non-initiation of life support, i.e., as medical omission 
rather than medical killing.77 The public, however, generally perceives 
the removal of life support as an active killing by a physician.7s 
In 1975, the trial court in Quinlan regarded removal of a respirator as a 
form of homicide. The removal of a respirator without consent is still 
treated as homicide .. .. In short, disconnecting life support is, in popular 
consciousness, viewed as causing death (i.e., a form of killing) rather than 
as letting a natural death occur. This common association of withdrawal 
of life support with killing undermines the force of the symbolic rationale 
for distinguishing withdrawal of life support from PAS.79 
Similarly, where a patient dies following the medical administration of 
analgesics in doses that posed a risk of hastening that patient's death, 
the public views the physician's action as having killed that patient. so 
They believe that the imperatives of pain control prompted the 
caretaker to intentionally overdose the suffering patient. s1 So while a 
ban on intentional killing via PAD in theory reinforces a social 
message about the sanctity of life, that message is already eroded in 
the context of death and dying by the socially accepted withdrawal of 
LSMT and by the public perception that administration of analgesics is 
a widespread technique for hastening death. It may still be arguable 
that legalization of PAD would undermine the sanctity of life 
principle. But it is more likely that PAD would do just what rejection 
77. See supra note 52. 
78. Orentlicher, supra note 52, at 663 ("[T]he withdrawal of treatment is no less an act of 
killing than suicide."). 
79. Cantor, Glucksberg, supra note 32, at 307 (citing In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975)). In Japan, withdrawal of LSMT is treated as a form of euthanasia. 
Mendelson & Jost, supra note 73, at 137. See also Henk Jochemson, Life-Prolonging and 
Life-Terminating Treatment of Severely Handicapped Newborn Babies, 8 lssues in L. & MED. 
167, 168 (1992). 
80. Marcia Angell, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide - The Ultimate 
Right, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50, 51 (1997) [hereinafter Angell, The Supreme Court]; 
Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia: Orchestrating ' The Last Syllable of . . .  Time,' 53 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 153 (1991); David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians: Physician-Assisted Suicide after 
Glucksberg/Quill, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 161, 233 (1998); John A. Robertson, Respect for 
Life in Bioethical Dilemmas - The Case of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
329, 334 (1997); Thomas A. Preston, Killing Pain, Ending Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, 
at A27. 
81. ROGER S. MAGNUSSON, ANGELS OF DEA TH: EXPLORING THE EUTHANASIA 
UNDERGROUND 192-94 (2002). Indeed, some clinicians perceive no real distinction between 
palliative care that risks hastening death and active intervention to shorten a suffering 
patient's dying process. Rocker & Curtis, supra note 43, at 822. 
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of LSMT does - reassure fatally stricken patients that they will have 
some control over a painful or demeaning dying process.82 
David Orentlicher offers an alternative explanation for differential 
legal treatment of PAD and LSMT. He suggests that the ban on PAD 
served initially as a rough demarcation of society's moral judgment 
about medical intervention in the dying process - "a useful proxy for 
separating morally valid and morally invalid" patient requests for aid 
in dying.83 Orentlicher's explanation for initial reticence toward PAD 
seems sound. When end-of-life medical handling surfaced as a legal 
issue in the 1970s, the notion of suicide - or assistance to suicide -
was strongly associated with mentally deranged people seeking to 
escape from life circumstances. Most suicides were regarded as 
morally problematic, so a dichotomy between rejecting LSMT and 
suicide was appealing. At that time, courts were taking their first 
hesitant steps in marking the legality of some patients' choices to end 
torturous dying processes. Judges were understandably reluctant to 
connect rejection of LSMT with suicide. For Orentlicher, the 
subsequent decades of experience with end-of-life medical practices 
indicate that the initial legal and moral dichotomy between LSMT and 
PAD was misplaced. For Kamisar, the moral dichotomy may not be 
convincing, but the hazards of abuse which he pointed to in 1958 still 
warrant legal prohibition of PAD. 
C. Hazards of Abuse 
Yale Kamisar's premise in 1958 was that "practical obstacles," not 
morals, explain why PAD should not be legalized. Since then, forty­
five years of medical practice and thirty-eight years of jurisprudence 
relating to end-of-life medical practices have intervened. Nonetheless, 
Kamisar and the vast majority of other opponents of PAD have not 
altered their focus on the abuses that they argue would accompany 
legalization of PAD.84 They have only refined their arguments and 
sought to add empirical proofs drawn from the Netherlands as well as 
the United States. 
82. When competent, afflicted persons are allowed to shape the medical response to 
their condition, autonomy is respected rather than life derogated. "[T]he value of life is 
desecrated not by a decision to refuse medical treatment but 'by the failure to allow a 
competent human being the right of choice.' " In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (N.J. 1987) 
(quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985)). But see Eric A. Johnson, Assisted Suicide, 
Liberal Individualism, and Visceral Jurisprudence: A Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 20 
ALASKA L. REV. 321, 323 (2003) (arguing that a patient's choice to die in a deteriorated 
condition offends similarly debilitated disabled persons whose Jives are supposedly being 
deemed worthless). 
83. Orentlicher, supra note 52, at 664-65. 
84. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
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Opponents' concerns about abuse relate primarily to the impaired 
mental processes of seriously ill people making decisions about the 
momentous matter of PAD. Psychological impediments to sound 
decisionmaking include depression, fatigue, frustration, anxiety, pain, 
nausea, alertness-dulling medications, and pressure from surrounding 
caregivers and family. "Patients are not ideally autonomous agents but 
anxious, fearful, depressed, often confused, and subject to ill­
considered and mistaken ideas."85 Kamisar and others have added a 
special concern for vulnerable populations such as ethnic minorities 
and the aged, noting that PAD would be practiced "through the prism 
of social inequality and prejudice that characterize the delivery of 
[health care] services."86 Some contemporary commentators insist that 
legalized PAD would become "a deadly license for physicians to 
recommend and prescribe death, free from outside scrutiny."87 
The psychological concerns echo Kamisar's 1958 warnings, but 
they are reinforced by physicians' experience over the last forty-five 
years. Modern commentators frequently note that physicians lack 
training in assessing competence and that competence determinations 
lack established criteria and are complex and difficult for physicians to 
perform.88 A similar concern goes to physicians' ability to detect and 
respond to clinical depression in seriously ill patients. Opponents of 
PAD assert that physicians tend to be untrained in and inadequate at 
recognizing treatable depression affecting patients' judgment.89 
The hazard of "undue influence" upon patients considering PAD is 
another concern. One specter is subtle or not-so-subtle influence by 
physicians upon their dependent patients. The fear is that physicians 
might use their status and control of information to manipulate 
patients into agreeing to PAD.90 One prominent observer claims that 
patient autonomy is "illusory" in the medical treatment context 
because physicians so frequently end up determining their patients' 
85. Jeffrey Blustein, The Family in Medical Decisionmaking, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
May 1993, at 12; see also Johnson, supra note 82, at 342-43. 
86. Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support PAS, supra note 4, at 118 n.20. 
87. Kass, supra note 37, at 25; WESLEY J. SMITH, FORCED EXIT 4-5 (1997) [hereinafter 
SMITH, FORCED EXIT]. 
88. Cohn & Lynn, supra note 28, at 256; Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Now 
is the Moment to Reflect: Two Years of Experience with Oregon's Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Law, 8 ELDER L.J. 1, 6-9, 1 1 ,  22 (2000). 
89. Harvey M. Chochinov & Leonard Schwartz, Depression and the Will to Live in the 
Psychological Landscape of Terminally Ill Patients, in THE CASE AGAINST SUICIDE 269 
(Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002); David C. Clark, 'Rational Suicide' and 
People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 155-57 (1992). 
90. Kamisar, PAS: The Problems Presented, supra note 4, at 1134-35; Martyn & 
Bourguignon, supra note 88, at 49-50. 
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medical fates.91 The influence of surrounding family - conflicted by 
their own emotional and financial interests - is another concern. The 
fear is that as PAD becomes routinized, surrounding health care 
providers will not have the time or skill to detect family exercise of 
undue influence. In fact, a common criticism of PAD is that various 
extrinsic pressures, stemming from a tacit message embodied in 
legalization of PAD, will inevitably generate a "duty to die" on the 
part of aged or highly debilitated medical patients.92 
Two further concerns about abuse of PAD have surfaced only in 
recent decades. The first flows from the fact that financing of medical 
care has shifted from a fee-for-service model to a managed-care 
framework. The capitation payment mechanism often used by HMOs 
creates financial incentives to curb expensive care, and medical care in 
the last year of life tends to be particularly expensive.93 Physicians' 
financial interests might influence them to be less aggressive in 
providing needed care to chronically ill and elderly patients, and then 
PAD looms as a temptation. The emergence of new pain-relief 
techniques has generated a second concern about a connection 
between PAD and palliative care. Supposedly, legalization of PAD 
might divert attention from continued development of palliative 
techniques or might provide a convenient substitute for loving, 
supportive end-of-life care.94 
Procedural safeguards form one response to all these hazards. 
Proponents of PAD regularly urge protective mechanisms along the 
lines of the current Oregon statute governing physician-assisted 
suicide. Patients appearing to be mentally disturbed must be referred 
for psychiatric examination, independent medical examination needs 
to confirm the treating doctor's diagnosis and assessment of 
competence, and a waiting period will be imposed in order to confirm 
the patient's wish for PAD.95 
91. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Compassion is Not Enough, in THE CASE AGAINST 
ASSISTED SUICIDE 41, 48 (Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002). 
92. See, e.g. , Cohn & Lynn, supra note 28, at 241 (arguing that PAD could be perceived 
as a social obligation); Kamisar, PAS: The Problems Presented, supra note 4, at 1134-35 
(choosing death could be perceived as "the 'right' thing to do"); Kass, supra note 37, at 24. 
93. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cora/ling Kevorkian: Regulating Physician-Assisted Suicide in 
America, 7 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 41, 46, 75 (1999); Cohn & Lynn, supra note 28, at 239; M. 
Cathleen Kaveny, Managed Care, Assisted Suicide, and Vulnerable Populations, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1275, 1281 , 1299-1300 (1998). 
94. Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 88, at 35, 43; Lois Shepherd, Face to Face: A Call 
for Radical Responsibility in Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 445, 509-12 (2003). 
Marcia Angell convincingly replies: "Good comfort care and the availability of physician­
assisted suicide are no more mutually exclusive than good cardiologic care and the 
availability of heart transplantation." Angell, The Supreme Court, supra note 80, at 51 .  
95. E.g. , Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act  to Authorize and Regulate 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1996); Calandrillo, supra note 93, at 94-
97; Arthur L. Caplan et al., The Role of Guidelines in the Practice of Physician-Assisted 
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One concern about building elaborate procedural protections into 
a PAD scheme is fear of a backlash seeking to impose onerous 
procedural protections upon medical cessation of LSMT.96 The 
implication from this fear of backlash is that current procedures 
regarding end-of-life medical decisions are working adequately and 
shouldn't be saddled with stringent procedures. That assessment seems 
sound. Death and dying jurisprudence and medical experience of the 
last thirty-eight years indicate that current procedures are adequate to 
protect competent patients' end-of-life decisions about LSMT. Those 
procedures generally involve an attending physician's assessment of 
competence, a psychiatric consult when competence is in doubt, 
informed consent including presentation of all options, efforts to 
dissuade a patient from any ill-considered decision, and ultimate 
implementation of the patient's chosen course. That informal process 
has worked reasonably well in preventing premature termination of 
life, so it would indeed be unfortunate if a backlash effect made those 
processes more cumbersome. Even minor changes might be 
obstructive of sound practice. In New Jersey, for example, physicians 
vigorously objected to a regulation by the Board of Medical 
Examiners that mandated two independent physicians' involvement 
before an attending physician could honor a competent patient's 
choice to end life support.97 
All the concern about abusive practices raises an important issue 
about the relation between the numerous dangers associated with 
PAD and American experience regarding rejection of LSMT by 
competent medical patients. Every cited hazard of PAD exists as well 
in the context of rejection of LSMT - medical uncertainty both in 
assessing capacity to consent and in making an accurate prognosis;98 
Suicide, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 476 (2000); Heilig et al., supra note 72, at 372-73. 
Some commentators - among them opponents of PAD - warn that procedural machinery 
can become so cumbersome and protracted that it no longer provides a real option for a 
dying person seeking relief via PAD. Yale Kamisar originally sounded this alarm. Kamisar, 
Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 979. He repeated the theme later, Yale Kamisar, 
Details Doom Assisted-Suicide Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at A27, and others have 
adopted it. See James L. Underwood, The Supreme Court's Assisted Suicide Opinions in 
International Perspective: Avoiding a Bureaucracy of Death, 73 N.D. L. REV. 641, 682-83 
(1997); Kathy L. Cenninara, Regulating How We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues 
Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 281, 285 (1999) (book review). 
Some people first demand onerous procedural protections and then argue that any 
protective system would be unwieldy and unusable - a Catch-22 situation. 
96. Annas, supra note 54, at 1 101; Kamisar, The 'Right to Die, ' supra note 4, at 495; 
Susan M. Wolf, Honoring Broader Directives, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1991, 
at 58. 
97. Their agitation prompted repeal of the offending regulation. Joseph C. D'Oronzio, 
The Infamous Farrell Footnote: Public Policy as the Smile of the Cheshire Cat, 9 CAMBRIDGE 
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 568 (2000). 
98. Clark, supra note 89, at 152 (recounting how people commit suicide in the mistaken 
belief that they are fatally ill). 
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the possible insidious effect upon decisionmaking from psychosocial 
factors like depression, anxiety, helplessness, and frustration;99 the 
hazard of undue influence upon the patient's decision by physicians, or 
medical staff, or family members conflicted by their own interests in 
the medical decision; the hazard that sick persons will be influenced by 
a "duty to die" when they become dependent upon others in an 
expensive or emotionally burdensome way;100 the hazard that 
ignorance or carelessness will cause health-care providers to provide 
inadequate palliative care and thus prompt premature invocation of 
PAD; the hazard of disproportionate impact on minority patients 
either because of latent prejudice or economic disadvantage; the 
hazard that financial incentives will impel physicians - in order to 
avoid expensive end-of-life medical care - to influence patients to 
hasten death. Most of these dangers of abuse long predate PAD; they 
have existed ever since competent patients and their physicians began 
to manage the dying process via decisions about medical interventions 
and pain-relief techniques.101 Indeed, manipulation of vulnerable 
patients is a potential problem accompanying any serious medical 
intervention for which informed consent is required. Think open-heart 
surgery. 
Think dialysis as a locus of "hazards" accompanying rejection of 
LSMT. Cessation of dialysis (with ensuing death from renal failure) is 
an option adopted by thousands of patients each year.102 Nephrologists 
therefore recognize and cope with the typical difficulties attendant to 
critical medical procedures - assessment of mental competence, 
prognosis with and without further treatment, projection of quality of 
life with and without treatment, screening for serious depression or 
other emotional distortions of judgment, and prevention of undue 
influence by people close to the patient.103 
99. Chochinov & Schwartz, supra note 89, at 262-64; Mark D. Sullivan et al., Should 
Psychiatrists Serve as Gatekeepers for Physician-Assisted Suicide? HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
July 1998, at 24, 27-29. 
100. KEOWN, supra note 41, at 276-77; Alister Browne, Assisted Suicide and Active 
Voluntary Euthanasia, 2 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 35, 46 (1989); Martin Gunderson & 
David J. Mayo, A ltruism and Physician Assisted Death, 18 J. MED. & PHIL. 281, 286-88 
(1993). Note that family pressures are acute in some other medical contexts, such as organ 
transplants to relatives. Carl H. Fellner & John R. Marshall, Kidney Donors - The Myth of 
Informed Consent, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1245, 1248 (1970). 
101. Nor am I the only commentator who points out that the risks of abuse are just as 
great in the context of LSMT as in PAD. Others have noted that PAD would not introduce 
"any additional risks to patients who may already opt to cut short a fate they view as worse 
than death." Mayo & Gunderson, supra note 30, at 14, 18; Orentlicher, supra note 52, at 664. 
102. Lewis M. Cohen et al., Practical Considerations in Dialysis Withdrawal, 289 JAMA 
2113 (2003). 
103. Id. at 2115-17. 
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Again, rejection of LSMT poses hazards for patients Gust as PAD 
does). Yet despite thousands of deaths per day associated with medical 
management of the dying process, medical services for dying patients 
have been remarkably free of widespread abuse in the sense of 
premature terminations of human lives.104 Abuses do surface at times 
involving termination of life-support,105 but the more prevalent hazard 
for fatally stricken patients still seems to be unwanted over-treatment 
and excessive prolongation of the dying process rather than premature 
hastening of death.106 Disproportionate impacts on minorities do not 
appear in termination-of-life studies,107 a fact perhaps attributable to 
those patients' susp1c1ons regarding white-dominated medical 
establishments.108 Nor do data support the contention that PAD would 
disproportionately impact poor people. The reasons for that are 
uncertain. In the Netherlands, a national health-care system makes all 
forms of medical support available to all citizens. In Oregon, the 
elaborate process for securing PAS may make that process accessible 
only to patients who are relatively affluent. Or perhaps poor persons 
are more tenacious in clinging to life than the effete middle class who 
are more sensitive to indignity? Or poor persons might be more 
suspicious of the medical establishment and hence more unwilling to 
trust physicians who would cooperate in PAD. The absence of any 
assured ultimate recourse to PAD may actually prompt some fatally 
stricken people to seek to hasten death prematurely, fearing that 
otherwise they will be trapped in a degenerative spiral.109 
For the most part, opponents of PAD ignore the fact that removal 
of life support from competent patients poses no risks markedly 
104. Occasionally, reports surface about medical personnel who became pathological 
serial killers. See Mary Jo Patterson, Similar Clues Emerge on a Trail of Death, NEWARK 
STAR LEDGER, Jan. 14, 2004, at 1 .  
105. For an  anecdote of  suspicious pressure being employed (by the younger girlfriend 
of an eighty-one year-old, wealthy patient), see John La Puma & David L. Schiedermayer, 
The Bookie, the Girlfriend, and the Vultures, 1 14 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 98 (1991); see 
also Douglas 0. Linder, The Other Right-to-Life Debate: When Does Fourteenth Amendment 
'Life' End?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 182, 1 187 (1995) (providing a survey indicating physicians 
terminating life support over objections of family). 
106. E.g. , Edmondson, supra note 64, at 940; see also Support Study, Howard Brody et 
al., Withdrawing Intensive Life Sustaining Treatment, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652 (1997). 
107. Cohen et al., supra note 102, at 2116 (noting that African Americans cease dialysis 
at only half the rate of whites); Eric L. Krakauer et al., Barriers to Optimum End-of-Life 
Care for Minority Patients, 50 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'y 182, 182-90 (2002); Peter A. Selwyn 
& Marshall Forstein, Overcoming the False Dichotomy of Curative vs. Palliative Care for 
Late-Stage HIV/AIDS, 290 JAMA 806, 811 (2003) .  
108. While African Americans may receive less resource-intensive care, they are also 
more insistent on continuing LSMT. La Vera Crawley et al., Palliative and End-of-Life Care 
in the African-American Community, 284 JAMA 2518, 2519 (2000); Selwyn & Forstein, 
supra note 107, at 811. 
109. Newman, supra note 80, at 176-77. 
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different in kind from PAD. They ignore that cessation of LSMT -
seldom subjected to formal processes - has an approximately thirty­
five year history with relatively few signs of abuse. When opponents of 
PAD do pay attention to the comparative risks from LSMT and PAD, 
they doggedly insist that while the era of LSMT has been surprisingly 
free of abuse, PAD would be much more hazardousY0 One of their 
points is simply a "quantitative distinction" - a claim that there would 
be a greater number of decisions involving PAD than LSMT. 
Rejection of life support only becomes an issue when people have 
physically deteriorated to a point of machine dependency while PAD, 
if legalized, could become an option for any suffering, competent, 
fatally stricken person. So there would supposedly be many more end­
of-life decisions if PAD were legalized, as debilitated patients 
considered hastening death before becoming machine dependent. 1 1 1  
But even under a legal structure allowing only LSMT, every fatally 
afflicted patient is probably entitled to reject oral nutrition and also 
decline ANH, thereby having an option to precipitate his or her own 
death even before becoming machine dependent.112 Thus, an 
opportunity to hasten death exists for every competent, fatally stricken 
patient even before that person becomes machine dependent. 
A more troubling claim is that PAD will be more susceptible to 
abuse than LSMT because of the location in which PAD is likely to 
transpire. Cessation of life support usually occurs in an institutional 
setting where the process is visible to surrounding family and teams of 
health-care providers. That visibility might serve as a disincentive to 
abusive medical practices. By contrast, "[t]he prescription of lethal 
medication . . .  will occur most often in the privacy of a doctor's office 
or the patient's home, settings where effective oversight to minimize 
error or abuse would be more difficult, if not unrealizable."113 This 
argument for resisting PAD influenced the New York Task Force on 
Life and the Law114 and it has persuaded Yale Kamisar.115 
1 10. See Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 88, at 56 (claiming that the legal boundary 
of LSMT "has been vastly more effective at preventing abuse over a long period of time than 
its alternatives ever can be.") 
111 .  Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support PAS, supra note 4, at 124-25. 
1 12. While death by dehydration may sound repulsive, the reality is that a patient 
rejecting ANH can die a relatively placid demise, slipping into a coma after a few days and 
dying in seven to fourteen days. JAMES M. HOEFLER, MANAGING DEATH 117-27 (1997); 
Linda Ganzini et al., Nurses' Experiences with Hospice Patients Who Refuse Food and Fluids 
to Hasten Death, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 359 (2003). 
113. Carl H. Coleman & Tracy E. Miller, Stemming The Tide: Assisted Suicide and the 
Constitution, 23 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 389, 394 (1995); see also KEOWN, supra note 41, at 75. 
114. Carl H. Coleman, The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law: Why It 
Concluded Physician-Assisted Suicide Should Not Be Legalized, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 647 (1997). 
115. Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge, supra note 4, at 248. 
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I am not convinced that PAD is much more prone to abuse than 
LSMT. Cessation of LSMT has been carried out in hundreds of 
thousands of homes without serious allegation of abuse. While 
arrangements for physician-assisted suicide or active euthanasia may 
first be formed in the privacy of a physician's office, implementation 
will generally take place at home where some exposure is available. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court comments about end-of-life medical 
practice occurring within the home: 
We see no reason to fear that a patient at home is more vulnerable than 
one in an institution. In fact, probably just the opposite is true. 
Presumably, the patient receiving life-sustaining treatment at home [or 
care involving any serious medical condition] has a caring family or 
friend in attendance; otherwise, institutional care would be necessary. 
Our common human experience teaches us that family members and 
close friends care most and best for a patient.1 16 
In the home, presence of hospice caregivers (such as home health 
aides or visiting nurses) as well as surrounding family ensures a 
certain amount of transparency to the dying process. Even where no 
hospice program is involved, home health aides or family often 
attend seriously ill persons contemplating PAD. Interestingly, San 
Francisco area physicians have produced an identical protocol for a 
careful route to physician-assisted hastening of death whether the 
moribund patient is in a health care institution or at home.117 
Removal of LSMT may seem less susceptible to mistake or 
pressure than PAD because some patients rejecting LSMT survive for 
a period after cessation of treatment. This will be true for some cancer 
patients, some dialysis patients, some AIDS patients, and some ALS 
patients. Thus, cessation of life support sometimes leaves the 
moribund patient alive and capable of changing his or her mind about 
dying. Yet in practice PAD would also furnish to the patient an 
opportunity to reflect and change course. For PAD, if legalized in the 
United States, would be accompanied by a deliberate process -
independent physician confirmation of the patient's prognosis and 
mental state plus a mandatory waiting period during which the patient 
would be able to reconsider. 
In short, similar hazards of abuse accompany LSMT and PAD. 
And it would be unthinkable to regress and impose a cumbersome 
decisionmaking process upon LSMT. A substantial majority of deaths 
in the United States are medically managed (meaning doctors 
facilitate an earlier death than would otherwise occur). Imposition of 
stringent procedural processes would disrupt the end-of-life practice of 
116. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 414 (N.J. 1987). 
1 17. Heilig et al., supra note 72, at 372-73. The protocol obviously anticipates that 
trained personnel will be present in the home setting as well as in an institution. 
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medicine - causing prolongation of the dying process for hundreds of 
thousands of moribund patients who have reached a point of 
intolerable suffering or degradation. The bottom line is that onerous 
procedures should not be imposed upon medical practice involving 
either removal of LSMT or PAD for competent, fatally stricken 
patients. 
In my judgment, no convincing rationale supports the prevailing 
distinction between killing and letting die. And the most frequently 
voiced concern about PAD - the hazards of abuse - does not seem 
significantly more threatening than in the case of LSMT. That leaves 
another practical obstacle to legalization of PAD - the slippery slope. 
II. UNSAVORY EXTENSIONS 
Yale Kamisar conceded that PAD was morally justified in some 
instances of a dying, competent patient's irremediable pain coupled 
with a fixed desire to die. He nonetheless opposed legalization of 
PAD. He objected not only to hazards of abuse accompanying 
legalized hastenings of death, but also to eventual extensions of PAD 
to "far more objectionable practices."118 At that time, Kamisar 
primarily feared extension of PAD to nonvoluntary euthanasia (for 
patients who were not competent to make their own medical 
decisions) and to involuntary euthanasia (contrary to a competent 
patient's wishes or to the wishes of a surrogate representing a mentally 
incompetent patient). He cited the not-so-remote experience of Nazi 
Germany where the medical establishment had been enlisted in the 
performance of involuntary euthanasia first upon disabled citizens and 
later upon disfavored ethnic and political groups. Kamisar's conviction 
about the inevitable extension of PAD well beyond the dying, 
competent patient continues to occupy him and many other opponents 
of PAD to this day.1 19 
In the 1990s, proponents of PAD shifted gears and focused upon 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide - rather than active 
euthanasia - as an option for competent, terminally ill people who 
were suffering unbearably. The proponents' theory was that PAS 
would be more palatable to the public (and to judges and legislators) 
because leaving the fatal act in the hands of a competent person would 
make it more likely that the self-killing would be strictly voluntary.120 
1 18. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 1042. 
1 19. E.g., KEOWN, supra note 41, at 69-70; WESLEY J. SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH 
(2000) [hereinafter SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH]; Johnson, supra note 82, at 323; Kass, 
supra note 37, at 25-26. 
120. Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1381-82 (1992) [hereinafter Quill et 
al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill]. 
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Kamisar re-entered the fray and predicted that the purported 
boundaries would never hold up. For him, PAS would inevitably shade 
into voluntary active euthanasia ("V AE"). Then the practice of PAD 
would reach all afflicted, suffering people, including those not 
terminally ill. Eventually it would extend to people suffering not from 
illness but rather from harsh life circumstances.121 And, of course, he 
retained his original apprehensions about a slippery slope to 
nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia. 
Slippery slopes are genuine law-making concerns. A court or 
legislature asked to recognize a new right understandably worries 
about the ultimate boundaries of the prerogative being sought. For 
example, in 1997, when asked to recognize a constitutional right to 
assistance in dying (PAS), the United States Supreme Court expressed 
acute concern about the bounds and implications of the right they 
were being asked to endorse.122 Yet not every slippery slope argument 
is convincing.123 Each feared slide warrants examination. 
A. From Assisted Suicide to Active Euthanasia 
Kamisar had two reasons for his prediction that PAS would 
inevitably slide into active euthanasia. First, he doubted that it was 
possible to differentiate between these two modes of bringing about 
death. He gave examples of how the line between them might be 
blurred, as by a third party holding a patient in place while the patient 
performed an act of suicide or a third party holding a weapon while a 
weakened patient pulled the trigger. Second, he felt that compassion 
for a mentally competent but physically incapacitated person unable to 
perform a suicidal act would impel legalization of active third-party 
interventions. He envisioned third parties placing poison in the 
mouths of quadriplegics or injecting dying patients who simply could 
not, because of psychological barriers, bring themselves to perform the 
desired lethal act.124 
Additional reasons support the prediction of an inexorable 
carryover from PAS to active euthanasia. Botched suicides provide an 
example. Because physicians are not skilled at killing by poisons, some 
instances will occur where a patient's suicide attempt fails and a 
121. Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 4, at 745-47; Kamisar, PAS: The Last 
Bridge, supra note 4, at 230-33. 
122. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785-86 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
123. See Bernard Williams, Which Slopes are Slippery?, in MORAL DILEMMAS IN 
MODERN MEDICINE 128, 132-34 (Michael Lockwood ed., 1985) (urging good-sense 
assessments of whether any slippery slide will in fact occur). 
124. Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge, supra note 4, at 230-32; Kamisar, The 'Right to 
Die,' supra note 4, at 516. 
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physician will be called upon to administer a coup de grace.125 In the 
Netherlands, approximately 18% of assisted suicides result in serious 
complications or fail to work.126 The imperative of ending suffering 
then leads to an alternate mode of causing death, usually a lethal 
injection. Further, the rationale for confining assisted death to PAS is 
not particularly convincing. If undue influence and subtle pressures 
upon a debilitated patient are a serious concern, why would they be 
averted just because the patient is persuaded to take a poison rather 
than to submit to an injection? 
Opponents of PAD insist that PAS is merely "a strategy to 
introduce lethal injection or infusion and other more efficient forms of 
medicalized killing."127 But whether it's part of a conspiracy to 
promote all forms of medical killing or not, the push toward PAS in 
order to relieve suffering is unlikely to avoid a slide to active 
euthanasia. Kamisar was right on that score. Actual practice, if not the 
formal legal boundaries, would likely make the predicted slide. 
B. From the Terminally Ill to the Chronically Ill 
In the middle 1990s, when advocates of PAD were litigating to 
establish a constitutional right to PAS, they limited the right being 
sought to competent, terminally ill persons128 in the end stages of their 
dying processes. Kamisar saw this limitation as a temporary strategy 
by the "death-with-dignity" movement. If self-determination in the 
face of egregious suffering is the moving force behind a right to 
assisted death, he reasoned, how could chronically ill sufferers - who 
would otherwise suffer longer - be excluded?129 Why deny a right to 
relief to "those with nonterminal illnesses or disabilities who might 
have to endure greater pain and suffering for much longer periods" 
than terminal patients who will inevitably die within weeks or 
months?130 And why should dying, suffering patients, such as those 
with ALS or cerebral palsy or AIDS, have to wait to the final phase of 
their degenerative illnesses? Kamisar ridiculed the notion that 
government has a lesser interest than usual in preserving the lives of 
125. Cohn & Lynn, supra note 28, at 249; Kaveny, supra note 93, at 1305. 
126. N. Gregory Hamilton, Oregon's Culture of Silence, in THE CASE AGAINST 
ASSISTED SUICIDE 175, 189 (Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002). 
127. Id. at 183. 
128. E.g. , Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996); Compassion in Dying v. 
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). Terminally ill in that litigation context generally 
meant unavoidable death within a discrete period of time. That time period was often fixed 
at six months. 
129. Kamisar, The 'Right to Die,' supra note 4, at 489-90. 
130. Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support PAS, supra note 4, at 129. 
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people who have only a short life span left.131 Unconsented killing is 
usually unlawful homicide even if life is shortened by only a few 
minutes.132 
Kamisar's claim about extension of PAD to chronic illness 
sufferers seems (you should pardon the pun) dead-on. As he correctly 
notes, the same factors supporting any hastening of death - respect 
for autonomy in the face of affliction and compassion in the face of 
suffering - loom large when a stricken person faces a prolonged dying 
process. Think persons in the middle stages of degenerative diseases 
whose suffering has already reached a personally intolerable level.133 
We know that if a chronic illness sufferer comes down with 
pneumonia, that person has an option to reject LSMT. Must that 
prolonged sufferer's fate wait for the happenstance of intervening 
illness and dependence on medical support? The humanitarian 
impulse to "do the right thing" by ending suffering is a powerful force 
in such circumstances. For example, in jurisdictions where removal of 
life support is legally confined to formerly competent patients who 
previously articulated their wish to forgo life support in the 
circumstances now at hand, 134 circumventions and contrivances by 
medical staff are common. The medical staff either coaches the family 
to recall prior "instructions" from the now-incompetent patient or 
suddenly determines that the LSMT is actually futile and should be 
withdrawn.135 
The compassionate drive to provide relief for long-term, 
intractably suffering patients is powerfully reflected in several 
contexts. The American euthanasia movement, from its inception in 
1906, always sought relief for afflicted persons with intractable pain 
even if their lives were preservable for long periods.136 Modern 
131.  Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 4, at 742-43. Some early cases 
suggested that government has a lesser interest in preserving life that can only be "briefly 
extended," as opposed to life of long possible duration. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 
162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). That notion has essentially vanished from the jurisprudence of 
death and dying. Pub. Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 
419, 425 (N.J. 1987). But see Woods v. Kentucky, No. 1999-SC-0773-DG (Ky. Aug. 26, 2004). 
132. E.g. , Edinburgh v. Oklahoma, 896 P.2d 1 176, 1178 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). 
133. Think fatally stricken persons whose previous medical interventions have stabilized 
their conditions, yet whose circumstances have become so intolerable that they now want to 
remove the previously installed life-sustaining equipment. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 
Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Georgia v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. 
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). 
134. Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 
S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993); Mack v Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1993); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 
399 (Mich. 1995); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988); In re Westchester County 
Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988); In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997). 
135. See Robert N. Swidler, Harsh State Rule on End-of-Life Care Remains in Need of 
Reform, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26, 2000, at S-4 (describing such tactics in New York State). 
136. Lavi, supra note 72, at 756-57. 
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legislative proposals by death-with-dignity advocates often reflect 
similar solicitude for persons afflicted with intractable and unbearable 
long-term illnesses.137 The Dutch system as well has shown willingness 
to use PAD for persons affected by non-lethal pathology causing 
unremitting suffering.138 While terminal illness first provoked Dutch 
sympathy with PAD,139 relief of unremitting and personally intolerable 
suffering - regardless of the patient's potential longevity - has been 
the hallmark of permissible PAD both at the outset of Dutch death­
and-dying jurisprudence and under their recently adopted statute.140 
To be sure, arguments exist for confining any PAD prerogative to 
stages when unavoidable death is near. From a religious perspective, 
PAD in the final stages of a dying process poses less of " 'an arrogant 
usurping of the role of God. '  "141 On a secular plane, there are also 
reasons to confine PAD to patients facing near-term, unavoidable 
death. In contrast to a person facing near-term death, a person with a 
longer potential life span might be able to adapt and cope with the 
medical pathology being faced. If a person's condition is not 
immediately lethal, there might also be greater risk of medical error in 
prognosis142 or a better prospect of a miraculous medical advance to 
relieve the patient's condition. The response to all these factors is that 
properly informed patients can weigh these elements in making 
autonomous medical decisions. 
137. See Baron et al., supra note 95, at 25-34; Margaret Pabst Battin, Euthanasia, in 
HEALTH CARE ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 67 (Donald VanDeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 
1987); Pratt, supra note 80, at 187. 
138. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: The Legal Framework, 10 
MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. J. INT'L L. 319, 327-31 (2001). 
139. JOHN GRIFFITHS ET AL., EUTHANASIA AND LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 143 
(1998). 
140. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 138, at 327; Mendelson & Jost, supra note 73, at 137; 
Pratt, supra note 80, at 180; Cynthia M. Bumgardner, Comment, Euthanasia and Physician­
Assisted Suicide in the United States and the Netherlands: Paradigms Compared, 10 IND. INT'L 
& COMP. L. REV. 387, 408 (2000). 
141. ROBERT N. WENNBERG, TERMINAL CHOICES: EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE, AND THE 
RIGHT TO DIE 92-93 (1989) (quoting CHARLES CURRAN, POLITICS, MEDICINE, AND 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 161-62 (1973)). For some religions, PAD would constitute intermeddling 
in God's dominion over life and death. 
142. Some commentators are uncomfortable with the uncertainty of medical projections 
that patients will die within a particular time span, such as six months. Cohn & Lynn, supra 
note 28, at 243, 252-55; Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 88, at 33. Yet terminal illness 
projections (six-month spans in particular) are commonly used in the context of state 
advance-directive legislation and in Medicare qualifications for hospice care. Similarly, a 
patient contemplating rejection of life support will always seek physicians' projections of 
likely life span. Does it matter if the physician's projection is wrong and the patient would 
actually live eight months rather than six months? Patients can be informed that any medical 
prognosis is inexact; that fact becomes part of the competent patient's calculus in deciding 
whether to accept treatment. 
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Society might perceive the hastening of death of a person with long 
prospective longevity as an immoral rebuke to sanctity-of-life 
principles.143 Nonetheless, as Kamisar notes, similar arguments about 
the importance of longer potential longevity did not prevail over 
autonomous patient choice in the context of rejection of LSMT.144 A 
competent patient's right to refuse treatment exists even if the patient 
might otherwise live a long time, perhaps even in good health.145 The 
autonomy interest of a suffering patient is just as strong when PAD is 
being sought as when treatment is being rejected. Moreover, any 
limitation to a particular life span would seem arbitrary. How close 
would death have to be in order for a stricken patient facing 
intolerable suffering to be entitled to relief? In short, Kamisar is right 
that any PAD prerogative could not plausibly be confined to the end 
stages of fatal illness. 
C. From the Chronically Ill to the Existentially Unhappy 
People can go through extreme emotional suffering unrelated to 
any underlying physical or mental infirmity. Various life circumstances 
- loss of a loved one, conviction of a shameful crime, or ruinous 
financial setback - have the potential to cause terrible anguish and 
despair. That despair, in turn, can prompt the unfortunate person to 
seek relief via suicide. 
Yale Kamisar has always believed that legalization of PAS would 
ultimately lead to legalization of assistance to any ostensibly rational 
suicide.146 For him, unbearable suffering is the justification for assisted 
suicide and such suffering extends beyond the realm of medical 
pathology to intolerably painful life circumstances. Just as mental 
anguish and an accompanying wish for death can understandably be 
grounded in a pathological medical condition, they can also be 
grounded in devastating life circumstances.147 Kamisar and others 148 
argue that compassion for suffering persons would make extension of 
legalized PAD to the context of existential unhappiness inevitable. 
143. Orentlicher, supra note 52, at 666. 
144. Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 4, at 741. 
145. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425 
(NJ. 1987). 
146. Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge, supra note 4, at 233-35. Rational suicide would 
presumably be suicide based on verifiable circumstances so dismal that a choice to die seems 
"reasonable." 
147. Glanville Williams, an initiator of the modern effort to legalize euthanasia, did not 
know whether PAS should be confined to painful physical disease or be extended to anyone 
in existential distress. Glanville Williams, Euthanasia and the Physician, in BENEFICENT 
EUTHANASIA 145, 165 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975). 
148. Pratt, supra note 80, at 165; Bumgardner, supra note 140, at 389. 
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At first blush, the Dutch experience suggests that Kamisar's claim 
is correct, though the Dutch are still wrestling with the issue. In the 
Netherlands, physicians originally assumed that PAD would be 
confined to unbearable suffering connected to physical conditions -
what the Dutch call suffering with a somatic basis.149 In the early 1990s, 
however, a case arose indicating the Dutch system's tolerance for PAS 
grounded in mental anguish stemming from a pathological mental 
condition.1so A series of traumatic events - the suicide of one son, a 
bitter divorce, and her last child's death from cancer - left fifty-year­
old Hilly Boscher suffering unbearably and seeking death. Doctor 
Chabot conducted thirty therapy sessions and recommended intensive 
grief therapy and antidepressants. Ms. Boscher declined further 
psychiatric intervention and persisted in her desire for assistance in 
suicide to end her unbearable anguish. Dr. Chabot then consulted by 
phone with four psychiatrists and proceeded to write a prescription for 
a poison that Ms. Boscher used to end her life. Dr. Chabot was 
convicted by a court for unlawfully assisting a suicide and also 
reprimanded by a medical disciplinary body. The derelictions 
prompting his conviction and discipline were his reliance on phone 
consultations and his failure to insist on further therapy for Ms. 
Boscher before supplying the means for suicide. Neither the court nor 
the professional disciplinary body required that psychic suffering 
justifying assisted suicide be based on a physical disorder.1s1 The 
unbearable suffering necessary to justify PAD could apparently be 
based on a psychic disorder such as Ms. Bosch's pathological 
depression. 
A subsequent case, however, signaled that the Dutch system does 
not authorize assistance to suicide where the person seeking assistance 
is merely escaping adverse life circumstances. General physical decline 
due to aging made eighty-six-year-old Mr. Brongersma feel that he 
was leading " 'a pointless and empty existence. '  "1s2 He sought 
assistance in dying to relieve his unhappiness. Dr. Sutorius provided 
the means and Mr. Brongersma committed suicide. Dr. Sutorius was 
accused of going beyond the permissible bounds of assistance to 
suicide, but the trial court acquitted him. In 2000, the Dutch court of 
appeals and the Dutch medical society both rejected the trial court's 
position. For them, unbearable suffering justifying assistance to suicide 
had to be grounded in physical or psychiatric illness rather than mere 
149. GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 139, at 143-44. 
150. Id. at 149-50, 329-37; Cohen-Almagor, supra note 138, at 335-39. 
151. GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 139, at 334-35. 
152. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 138, at 340 (quoting Tony Sheldon, Dutch GP Cleared 
after Helping to End Man's 'Hopeless Existence, ' 321 BRIT MED. J. 1 170, 1 174 (2000)). 
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unhappiness associated with aging.153 They drew a line between 
suffering stemming from medical conditions and existential 
suffering.154 Not everyone in the Netherlands agrees with that line. 
After the Netherlands in 2001 adopted a statute authorizing PAD for 
"lasting and unbearable suffering," some elderly people demanded 
that the right to assistance in dying be extended to them even if they 
were just tired of life.155 But the line between existential unhappiness 
and somatic bases for suffering currently appears to hold in the 
Netherlands. 
On the question of whether legalized PAD must ultimately be 
extended to people anguished by life circumstances, Kamisar is 
probably wrong. American society has a long history of antipathy 
toward suicide, perhaps grounded in the stereotypical image of a 
deranged, spurned lover or bankrupt entrepreneur. Supporters of 
death with dignity did not attack all suicide laws, but rather their 
application to people afflicted with serious illness. Though Chief 
Justice Rehnquist cheated in Washington v. Glucksberg when he 
essentially treated the dying patients' claim as a generalized attack on 
government impediments to all suicides, he was correct that this 
country has never recognized a broad right to choose the time and 
manner of one's death. Nor has it ever recognized a broad right to 
freedom from suffering. Generally, people are not required to be good 
Samaritans to suffering strangers and injured people are expected to 
cover their own catastrophic losses. 
The prevailing American ethic respects autonomy in the face of 
natural affliction, 156 not escape from unhappy life circumstances. The 
probable explanation is that American society draws a moral line 
between choosing death in the face of affliction and choosing death to 
escape unhappy circumstances.157 Society deeply sympathizes with 
people facing fatal afflictions, especially when those people seek to 
avoid a demeaning dying process and especially when they are 
resisting bodily invasions. Society somehow deems it morally offensive 
for people to repudiate life just because of circumstances that might 
153. Cohen-Alrnagor, supra note 138, at 340-41. The Royal Dutch Medical Society 
declared that basing PAD on a person's "social decline," rather than on physical or 
psychiatric illness, "stretched too far" the appropriate guideline - unbearable suffering. Id. 
154. KEOWN, supra note 41, at 87, 290. 
155. Dec. 12, 2001 e-mail from Derek Humphrey. 
156. For people who have never been competent, the prevailing ethic is respect for 
intrinsic dignity and well-being rather than autonomy. See NORMAN L. CANTOR, MAKING 
MEDICAL DECISIONS FOR THE PROFOUNDLY MENTALLY DISABLED (forthcoming from 
M.l.T. Press 2005). 
157. David Orentlicher & Lois Snyder, Can Assisted Suicide Be Regulated?, 11 J. 
CLINICAL ETHICS 358, 360 (2000); J. David Velleman, A Right of Self-Termination?, 109 
ETHICS 606 (1999). 
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change at any moment, while it understands inability to cope with 
natural afflictions of the body. In upholding a competent patient's 
rejection of further life-sustaining respirator therapy, for example, the 
Nevada Supreme Court commented: "[I]f Kenneth had enjoyed sound 
physical health, but had viewed life as unbearably miserable because 
of his mental state, his liberty interest would provide no basis for 
asserting a right to terminate his life with or without the assistance of 
other persons. "158 
The superior moral status of seeking death in the face of affliction 
- as opposed to adverse life circumstances - is reflected in the 
divergent legal treatment of persons seeking to die by refusal to eat. 
Courts allow fatally afflicted medical patients to cease eating and 
reject ANH, but generally restrain physically healthy hunger strikers 
who determine to precipitate their own demise by refusing to eat.159 
Existentially unhappy people have the means to kill themselves. 
Though many jurisdictions authorize physical intervention to prevent 
a suicide, there is rarely a legal prohibition on the act of suicide. 
Unhappy people can't expect society in general or the medical 
profession in particular to facilitate their suicidal course. Physicians 
have an acknowledged role and experience in diagnosing and healing 
illness, in relieving suffering associated with illness, and in managing 
the dying process for fatally afflicted persons;160 they have no 
comparable expertise in relieving unhappy people suffering from life 
circumstances. 
In sum, traditional social aversion to suicide grounded in unhappy 
life circumstances would likely confine legalized PAD to people whose 
unbearable suffering is associated with a medical affliction. This line 
might not be fully logical or satisfying. An unhappy elderly person 
merely tired of life would not be entitled to PAD, but that same 
person might suddenly become eligible to choose PAD following the 
happenstance of breaking his hip. (A similar anomaly exists regarding 
an existentially unhappy person whose health deteriorates, ultimately 
making the person dependent on medical intervention and therefore 
entitled to precipitate his own death.) The point here is that Kamisar's 
forecast - that legalized PAD must ultimately extend to all people 
with a rational basis for suicide - seems wrong. That error, however, 
by no means vitiates Kamisar's contention that PAD will yield 
unacceptable extensions. His most foreboding prediction is that PAD 
would not be confined to competent persons. 
158. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 625 (Nev. 1990). 
159. Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of Physician 
Conduct Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 95-100 (2000). 
160. By managing the dying process, I mean the physician's role in withholding or 
removing LSMT and providing palliative care to a moribund patient. 
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D. From Voluntary Euthanasia to Nonvoluntary or Even Involuntary 
Euthanasia 
Yale Kamisar is convinced that euthanasia could never be confined 
to competent persons.161 This is essentially because suffering can be 
just as intractable and heart-wrenching for people not competent to 
make their own medical decisions as for competent persons. He also 
foresees extension of active euthanasia to people whose existence 
becomes inconvenient or burdensome for those around them. As 
support for his predictions, he cites two phenomena - medical 
practice in the Netherlands over the last twenty-five years and existing 
American medical practice that allows termination of life support for 
permanently unconscious patients on the "pretension," he says, that 
such termination is fulfilling the wishes of the unconscious patient.162 
(He apparently believes that permanently unconscious persons are 
frequently removed from life support to suit the comfort and 
convenience of surrounding people rather than to fulfill the now­
incompetent patient's wishes.) Kamisar's underlying premise seems to 
be that extension of PAD to nonvoluntary euthanasia would not only 
be inevitable, but also a dangerous and unsavory development. 
Kamisar is almost certainly correct that the impetus to extend 
PAD to incompetent patients would be overwhelming. When a dying, 
incompetent patient has reached a point of deterioration that would 
prompt most competent patients to seek PAD, the impulse to extend 
similar "relief" to incompetent patients seems irresistible.163 This is 
especially true for a formerly competent patient who previously stated 
that she did not want to live in such a debilitated status,164 but it is also 
true for now-suffering patients who have never been competent to 
express their own preferences. Infants born with multiple deficits who 
are destined to live a short but painful existence provide one 
example.165 
161. See Kamisar, PAS: The Last Bridge, supra note 4, at 250. 
162. Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 4, at 751-52; Kamisar, The Reasons So 
Many People Support PAS, supra note 4, at 1 15. 
163. To be sure, there are commentators who insist that active euthanasia could and 
should be confined to competent persons. E.g., Bertram & Elsie Bandman, Rights, Justice, 
and Euthanasia, in BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA 81, 91-96 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975); Baruch 
Brody, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Law, in BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA 218 (Marvin Kohl 
ed., 1975) . Neither Kamisar nor I believe that such a limitation can be maintained. 
164. "Where a patient has consistently expressed a desire for euthanasia when a certain 
point is reached, the doctor may feel justified in assisting the patient, even when dementia 
intervenes in the meantime." MAGNUSSON, supra note 81, at 97. 
165. Tracy K. Koogler et al., Lethal Language, Lethal Decisions, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 37, 39; Mark Sklansky, Neonatal Euthanasia: Moral Considerations 
and Criminal Liability, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 5, 8 (2001); American Medical Association, Code 
of Ethics E-2.215, Treatment Decisions for Seriously Ill Newborns, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8460.html (last updated July 22, 2002). 
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A similar phenomenon took place in the context of LSMT. In 
theory, cessation of life support could have been confined to 
competent patients determining their own fate. Yet most jurisdictions 
recognized that such a policy would be inhumane to incompetent 
patients, as once a patient became incompetent they would have to be 
preserved by medical intervention no matter how torturous or 
demeaning their dying process might be. Most states therefore 
permitted surrogate end-of-life decisions according to the projected 
wishes of formerly competent patients or according to the best 
interests of now-incompetent patients.166 
Experience in the Netherlands tends to confirm Kamisar's 
prediction about nonvoluntary euthanasia. When euthanasia was 
initially practiced there, the assumption was that hastening the death 
of anyone in the absence of an explicit, competently made request 
would constitute murder.167 Dutch medical practice eventually· 
overrode that constraint in several areas - desperately ill newborns, 
permanently unconscious persons, now-incompetent patients who had 
previously declared their wishes,168 and now-incompetent patients in 
the final stages of a dying process. Ever since the Dutch began to 
survey euthanasia practices in the late 1980s, the data have shown that 
each year approximately 1000 cases of nonvoluntary euthanasia take 
place. Also, in approximately 1300 other cases, Dutch physicians 
annually administer lethal doses of analgesics to suffering, 
incompetent patients with the intention of ending those patients' 
lives.169 The Dutch do not classify such actions as euthanasia, but such 
lethal actions would be deemed euthanasia in the United States. 
In 1995, Dutch physicians used active euthanasia to terminate the 
lives of a number of infants born with multiple congenital disorders 
who were unavoidably dying, who did not die when medical 
intervention ceased, and whose pain treatment was not entirely 
successful.170 In one instance, a baby girl was born with Trisomy 13, a 
chromosomal condition causing deformities of the heart, kidneys, and 
brain.171 Her projected life span was a few months. Pain treatment did 
not seem fully effective and the baby was enduring side effects from 
pain medication. Facing their child's prospect of further deterioration 
and increased suffering, the parents requested and the treating 
physician administered a lethal injection. While many Dutch 
166. See Cantor, Twenty-five Years after Quinlan, supra note 3, at 191. 
167. GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 139, at 131-33. 
168. Id. at 96-97, 131-32. 
169. Id. at 18; KEOWN, supra note 41, at 106-08; Bumgardner, supra note 140, at 413-14. 
170. GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 139, at 124-26; KEOWN, supra note 41, at 119-20, 130; 
SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH, supra note 1 19, at 61-63; Jochemsen, supra note 46, at 451-53. 
171. GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 139, at 341-43. 
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physicians would have refused to perform euthanasia in such 
circumstances, others were willing to provide what they perceived as 
humane relief. Prosecutions ensued in two cases, but the trial and 
appellate courts upheld the use of active euthanasia.172 Dutch 
physicians have administered active euthanasia as well to permanently 
unconscious patients and to now-incompetent patients who previously 
expressed a wish to die.173 In short, Dutch medical practice did extend 
PAD from its origins as a purely voluntary measure to some instances 
of nonvoluntary active euthanasia.174 
The Dutch experience seems to verify Kamisar's slippery-slope 
thesis that the slide to nonvoluntary euthanasia would in fact take 
place if PAD were legalized in the United States. The same 
compassion toward people facing unbearable suffering or personally 
intolerable degradation as that which prompted Dutch doctors' 
transition to nonvoluntary PAD would surely move American 
physicians in the same direction. The harder question is whether, as 
Kamisar asserts, the extension of PAD to non voluntary situations 
would be an unacceptable development. 
According to many sources, the real danger in nonvoluntary PAD 
(beyond the symbolic message supposedly undermining sanctity of life 
172. Id. at 348-49. 
173. The phenomenon of euthanasia of now-incompetent patients has surfaced in 
studies of covert euthanasia as practiced in the United States. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., 
The Practice of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States, 280 JAMA 
507, 509, 51l  (1998); Rocker & Curtis, supra note 43, at 821. A survey of American doctors 
frequently dealing with end-of-life cases indicated that 7% had administered lethal injections 
to patients and 4.4% had provided poisons for patients. Diane E. Meier et al., A National 
Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States, 338 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. ll93, 1199 (1998). Among the 7% administering lethal injections, the physicians 
indicated that the patient was probably incompetent in almost 50% of the cases. But in 100% 
of the cases the physicians believed that the action reflected the patient's putative wishes. 
174. Dutch practice, even as applied to competent patients, has often deviated from the 
guidelines provided by the courts for defensible PAD. For relevant data, see KEOWN, supra 
note 41, at 205-07, and Cohen-Almagor, supra note 138, at 319-30. While the Dutch patient 
seeking PAD is supposed to make persistent requests for PAD, data indicate that some 
physicians acted after only one request and without the requisite waiting period in making 
PAD available. While the cooperating physician is supposed to consult with another 
physician about the patient's medical and psychological condition, Dutch physicians 
sometimes implemented PAD without an independent consultation. When physicians were 
prosecuted for failing to get an independent consultation, they were acquitted, merely 
admonished, or given light punishment. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 138, at 329-30. In 
addition, many Dutch physicians have ignored the reporting requirements attached to PAD. 
Perhaps there are cultural explanations for the Dutch medical deviations from 
guidelines. No physician likes what are perceived as administrative hurdles to sound medical 
practice. But the Dutch deviations from guidelines reflect a certain indifference to 
disciplinary mechanisms - an indifference that might be grounded in Dutch medical custom 
and tradition. Dutch physicians have certainly been free from widespread malpractice claims 
and from tight regulatory control. Perhaps American physicians would be more risk aversive 
and more compliant toward a regulatory scheme. Nonetheless, the important point is not the 
procedural deviations from Dutch guidelines, but rather that Dutch practice clearly slid from 
voluntary to non-voluntary PAD. 
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as described in Part I) is unsavory physician participation in "arbitrary, 
unjust judgments about the worth of their patients' lives."175 From that 
perspective, the real slippery slope is toward "lack of worth" 
judgments that will serve for "weeding out the handicapped, the old, 
the mentally retarded, whoever [doesn't] fit 'secular humanist' notions 
of the 'quality of life. '  "176 It is supposedly impossible to draw a 
principled line that would safely guide surrogate end-of-life decisions 
regarding mentally incapacitated patients when no previously 
expressed wishes are available. 177 Nonvoluntary PAD would, then, 
Kamisar claimed, pose an insidious threat to vulnerable populations. 
Neither American nor Dutch experience with the medical handling 
of mentally incompetent patients supports the envisioned scenarios. It 
is true that Dutch physicians participate each year in administering 
PAD to between one and three thousand mentally incompetent 
patients. Yet there has been no demonstration that these cases involve 
arbitrary or malevolent extermination of vulnerable, undervalued 
persons. A number of facts tend to dispel any such specter. In 
approximately 90% of these nonvoluntary cases, the patient's life is 
shortened by less than a week.178 This fact tends to show that the vast 
majority of nonvoluntary PAD in the Netherlands relates not to 
elimination of inconvenient or burdensome persons, but rather to 
hastening death at the end stage of conditions that make the dying 
process particularly painful or demeaning. A significant number 
(perhaps 25% of the entire total of nonvoluntary deaths) involve some 
kind of advance instruction - that is, situations where the now­
incompetent person previously expressed a wish to die under 
circumstances like those at hand.179 In a majority of the cases not 
involving prior expressions, physicians are moved by the perception 
that the patients are suffering severely; that is, the judgment is being 
175. KEOWN, supra note 41, at 252; PETER BYRNE, PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN MENTAL HANDICAP 81 (2000). 
176. PETER G. FrLENE, IN THE ARMS OF OTHERS 112 (1998) (quoting Russell Shaw, 
Death of Infant Doe: Why All the Surprise? WASH. POST, MAY 15, 1982, at A19); see also 
Woods v. Kentucky, No. 1999-SC-0773-DG (Ky. Aug. 26, 2004); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 
S.W.2d 408, 420 (Mo. 1988); KEOWN, supra note 41, at 25, 244; SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH, 
supra note 1 19, at 33-42, 65-78. 
177. KEOWN, supra note 41, at 251 .  Most sources concede that implementation of 
previously made, competent patient instructions should be permitted. Without that 
mechanism, an incentive would exist for competent, degenerating patients to prematurely 
seek to hasten death, fearful that if they slipped into incompetency their preferences about 
an appropriate end of life would not be honored. Interestingly, the new Dutch law has made 
provision for advance instructions to be implemented in the context of PAD. Cohen­
Almagor, supra note 138, at 325. 
178. GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 139, at 205-06, 225-28. 
179. Id.; KEOWN, supra note 41, at 104-05. 
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made (usually by a physician and the family of the patient together) 
that the patient's best interests dictate PAD.180 
Commentators also object to what they see as a particularly wide 
opening for subjective judgments that certain lives are not worth 
preserving. They claim that some measure of nonvoluntary PAD is 
performed in the Netherlands on the rationale of patient degeneration 
into such a level of indignity that the patient would not want to survive 
in that status. The further claim is that in judging intolerable indignity 
the doctor substitutes her own valuation of the patient's existence for 
that of the patient.181 
Yet experience in the United States, in the context of removal of 
LSMT from incompetent patients, indicates that intolerable indignity 
can be an appropriate and manageable criterion for surrogate end-of­
life decisionmaking.182 The real ethic of United States death and dying 
jurisprudence is to replicate what the now-incompetent patient would 
want done in the circumstances at hand.183 Where patients have 
previously expressed their own vision of intolerable indignity, as in an 
advance directive rejecting LSMT under certain circumstances, they 
have exercised a prospective autonomy that every state respects. In 
the absence of prior instructions, governing standards of substituted 
judgment, best interests of the patient, or constructive preference 
come into play.184 Constructive preference is a technique for making 
surrogate medical decisions on behalf of incompetent persons who 
have not issued prior instructions. The premise is that the vast 
majority of people care about indignity or quality of life in the dying 
process, and that - at least as to certain commonly occurring end-of­
life scenarios - common preferences about intolerable levels of 
indignity can be objectively ascertained and used as default 
180. KEOWN, supra note 41, at 104-05; Mendelson & Jost, supra note 73, at 138; Loes 
Pijnenborg et al., Life-Terminating Acts Without Explicit Request of Patient, 341 LANCET 
1196, 1 197-99 (1993). For some commentators, even egregious suffering is not a proper basis 
for ending a patient's existence. These commentators believe that suffering has redemptive 
value and that a troubled dying process challenges the expiring patient to show courage and 
composure. KASS, supra note 34, at 38; Gerald D. Coleman, Assisted Suicide: An Ethical 
Perspective, 3 Issues in L. & MED. 267, 276 (1987); Lavi, supra note 72, at 738-40. That is 
small consolation for suffering mortals who have already lost their cognitive abilities or who 
are unable to meet the spiritual challenge of overcoming pain. 
181. GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 139, at 137-39; KEOWN, supra note 41, at 105. 
182. The term originally used to describe surrogate removal of life support from 
incompetent patients was passive, nonvoluntary euthanasia. 
183. See Norman L. Cantor, The Real Ethic of Death and Dying, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1718, 
1731-35 (1996) (book review) [hereinafter Cantor, The Real Ethic]. 
184. The concept of surrogate decisionmaking according to constructive preference is 
spelled out in Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: 
Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients 
Without Advance Instructions, 48 RUTGERS. L. REV. 1 193 (1996) [hereinafter Cantor, 
Discarding Substituted Judgment]. 
1830 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:1793 
presumptions to guide surrogates.185 Strong common preferences are 
determinable via existing surveys, typical advance directives, and 
knowledge based on life experience. A shared judgment about 
intolerable indignity accounts for the widespread practice of American 
courts and legislatures to permit surrogate decisions removing life 
support from permanently unconscious patients who have not left 
prior instructions to the contrary; approximately 90% of people would 
want to be allowed to die in those intrinsically undignified 
circumstances.186 Kamisar calls this approach to shaping treatment of 
the permanently unconscious a pretense of fulfilling patients' wishes. I 
call it an accurate projection of patients' likely wishes based on what a 
large majority of people would want done for themselves in similar 
circumstances. In situations where no clear majority sentiment is 
discernible, the customary presumption in favor of life should prevail. 
These surrogate judgments are not expressions that the 
unconscious patient has no value or is worthless. By using medical 
decisionmaking standards like best interests of the patient, substituted 
judgment (where some evidence of the patient's treatment wishes 
exist), or constructive preference, surrogates seek to replicate what an 
incompetent patient would likely want done in the circumstances at 
hand. 
American experience does not yield data indicating that surrogate 
judgments about patients' best interests or likely preferences produce 
arbitrary or discriminatory decisions to cease LSMT. Thousands of 
medically managed deaths occur each week. The outcries of vitalists 
and right-to-life advocates to the contrary notwithstanding,187 any 
deviation from sound medical practice in end-of-life decisionmaking 
continues to be in the direction of excessive, unwarranted medical 
intervention and not premature termination of life. In sum, although 
voluntary PAD would indeed be extended to non voluntary PAD just 
as Kamisar projected, 188 that does not necessarily mean such an 
185. Id. at 1256-57; Cantor, Twenty-five Years after Quinlan, supra note 3, at 192-93. 
186. For survey data about public attitudes toward permanent unconsciousness, see 
James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 185, 
198-99, and Cathaleen A. Roach, Paradox and Pandora's Box: The Tragedy of Current 
Right-to-Die Jurisprudence, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 133, 157-58 (1991). 
187. SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH, supra note 1 19, at 33-39; SMITH, FORCED EXIT, supra 
note 87, at 36-67; Johnson, supra note 82, at 323-28. 
188. While I concur with the prediction that voluntary euthanasia would eventually slide 
to nonvoluntary euthanasia, I disagree that involuntary euthanasia is also an unavoidable 
development. Physician-performed involuntary euthanasia - a killing contrary to the wishes 
of a competent patient or the agent of an incompetent patient - is anathema in American 
society and is not likely to materialize if PAD were legalized. Involuntary mercy killing is an 
oxymoron. The Nazis branded what they did as euthanasia, but it was not. Their program 
was killing grounded in disdain rather than compassion. See WENNBERG, supra note 141, at 
218-19; Browne, supra note 100, at 47; Newman, supra note 80, at 167-68. Even if a 
physician's motive for an involuntary killing were compassion, the physician's unilateral act 
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extension is as highly objectionable as Kamisar claims. Nonvoluntary 
PAD would be administered according to the same standards 
applicable to surrogate LSMT decisions for incompetent patients. 
To me, that seems like a desirable result. In the context of LSMT, 
next of kin or appointed health-care agents tend to be cautious and 
hesitant in making surrogate medical decisions for fatally afflicted 
patients. Surrounding family and medical personnel serve as a check 
against abusive decisions by surrogates. Nonvoluntary, active 
euthanasia would be subject to the same standards and safeguards. 
The question, for me, is not whether PAD is appropriate, but whether 
it is necessary in light of existing medical approaches to alleviating the 
strains of the dying process. 
III. Is PAD NECESSARY? 
Yale Kamisar understood that while emotionally compelling cases 
for PAD might sometimes arise, legalization of PAD must be 
considered in light of various hazards of abuse and unsavory 
extensions associated with PAD and in light of the possibility that 
other modes of averting a painful death might obviate the necessity for 
PAD. The alternative modes he perceived in 1958 included non­
medical ways of committing suicide and emerging medical techniques 
for providing palliative care to ease the dying process. The more 
attractive of these options is effective palliative care that would ease 
the dying process and provide an incentive for patients to continue to 
live. Enormous strides in palliative techniques - particularly in pain 
relief - have occurred since 1 958. Those developments surely warrant 
consideration before reaching any conclusion about legalization 
of PAD. 
Contemporary opponents of PAD stress availability of modem 
pain-relief methods as an antidote to the pain and discomfort of a 
difficult dying process.189 Virtually all seriously ill patients can be made 
physically comfortable, they say, especially if deep sedation is used in 
would be unsupportable. See Cohen-Almagor, supra note 138, at 341 (describing the criminal 
conviction of a Dutch doctor for performing a mercy-motivated killing over the opposition of 
the incapacitated patient's daughter). There is ordinarily no physician's prerogative to 
perform any medical procedure - let alone a killing - without informed consent. In the 
U.S., there have been moments when elements within the pro-euthanasia movement showed 
signs of embracing involuntary euthanasia for the socially undesirable. Lavi, supra note 72, at 
758-59 (describing the platform of the Euthanasia Society of America in 1938); Teresa 
Harvey Paredes, The Killing Words? How the New Quality-of-Life Ethic Affects People with 
Severe Disabilities, 46 SMU L. REV. 805, 821 (1992) (describing sinister bills introduced 
before the Florida legislature in the late 1960s and early 1970s). None of these plans ever 
came close to being socially accepted. 
189. E.g., Nathan Cherny et al., The Treatment of Suffering When Patients Request 
Elective Death, IO J. PALLIATIVE CARE 71 (1994); Cohn & Lynn, supra note 28, at 244-45. 
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intractable cases.190 To the extent sophisticated pain relief methods are 
not sufficiently widespread, they urge more and better training in 
palliative care rather than resort to PAD. For them, "[m]edicine in fact 
has a great deal to offer, right up to the end, and failure to do so 
demands reform, not physician-assisted suicide."191 Good palliative care 
thus seems to offer a life-affirming route and does not prolong a 
natural dying process. 
The notion that effective pain relief obviates the necessity for PAD 
runs into some major problems. Most prominently, psychological or 
emotional suffering, rather than physical pain, is the source of most 
people's desire to hasten death. 192 Anxiety, dread, and frustration 
associated with actual and prospective debilitation and degeneration 
supply a major impetus for dying patients seeking to hasten death. 
Psychological interventions as part of good palliative care can alleviate 
the emotional suffering of most of these patients, but some can't be 
swayed in their desire for PAD.193 Deep sedation offers a potential 
haven from this intractable emotional suffering, 194 but the stupor or 
unconsciousness accompanying such sedation makes it a distasteful, 
demeaning option for some seriously ill patients.195 When helplessness, 
dependence, and indignity are major sources of upset to a dying 
patient, the prospect of lingering under deep sedation is not very 
palatable. Some patients therefore decline deep sedation and medical 
providers are understandably unwilling to override that opposition. 
And while patients rejecting sedation can still be provided with social 
and psychological support, some small number of dying patients will 
still prefer PAD.196 
The reality is that pain control and good palliative care are not full 
remedies for the indignity and emotional suffering that most disturb 
190. See Susan D. Block & J. Andrew Billings, Patient Requests to Hasten Death, 154 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2039, 2041 (1994) [hereinafter Billings & Block, Patient 
Requests]; Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 88, at 39 (noting that physical pain can be 
controlled in 98% of cases and deep sedation can be used in the remainder of cases). 
191. Cohn & Lynn, supra note 28, at 244 (emphasis in original); see also Misbin, supra 
note 28, at 1311. 
192. Cerminara, supra note 95, at 288; Newman, supra note 80, at 181. 
193. Emanuel et al., supra note 173, at 512 ("[P]alliative care is not necessarily an 
effective response to patients' request for euthanasia and PAS."). 
194. Chochinov & Schwartz, supra note 89, at 276. 
195. "Some see this 'pharmacological oblivion' as preferable to euthanasia, while others 
regard a drug-induced stupor in a patient who has requested release as a cruel denial of 
patient autonomy . . . . " MAGNUSSON, supra note 81, at 87. "Any protracted period of 
helpless, insensate lingering is anathema to people seeking a dignified passing." Cantor, 
Twenty-five Years after Quinlan, supra note 3, at 304. 
196. When patients do reject deep sedation, complications such as fatigue, 
breathlessness, dyspnea, nausea, vomiting, incontinence, and helplessness may still make 
their conscious existence uncomfortable and undignified. Browne, supra note 100, at 48-49. 
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dying patients.197 More and more data indicate that an unacceptable 
quality of life - usually meaning indignity associated with 
helplessness, loss of control, dependence, and sense of being a burden 
- account most for dying patients' desires to hasten death.198 Not 
physical pain, but rather "the prospect of losing control and 
independence and of dying in an undignified, unesthetic, . . . and 
existentially unacceptable condition" 199 often account for such a desire. 
In the Netherlands, for example, 46% of patients seeking euthanasia 
cite physical pain as an influencing factor while 57 % cite loss of dignity 
and 33% mention dependence.200 Likewise, data from Oregon's 
experience with legalized physician-assisted suicide support the notion 
that indignity is a bigger impetus than pain for patients seeking 
death.201 Similar conclusions flow from a study examining the impetus 
for patients who seek aid in dying in jurisdictions where such aid is 
unlawful.202 People care mightily about a soiled image left in the 
memories of loved ones when a dying process is protracted and 
demeaning.203 That aversion to indignity accounts for the unwillingness 
of some patients to accept deep sedation as a form of relief from 
emotional suffering. In short, good palliative care cannot alter the will 
of some small number of patients to accelerate their own deaths. 
197. William Breitbart et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Hastened Death 
in Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer, 284 JAMA 2907, 2910 (2000); Arthur L. Caplan et al., 
The Role of Guidelines in the Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 476, 480 (2000). 
198. "Research indicates that indignity, dependency and lack of control are more 
important than pain in motivating the desire to die." MAGNUSSON, supra note 81, at 90; see 
also Calandrillo, supra note 93, at 61; Emanuel et al., supra note 173, at 509; Gunderson & 
Mayo, supra note 100, at 284-85; Johnson, supra note 82, at 324-25; Quill et al., Care of the 
Hopelessly Ill, supra note 120, at 1383. 
199. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill, supra note 120, at 1383. 
200. KEOWN, supra note 41, at 109. But see id. at 127 (describing somewhat different 
results from a 1995 study, though 56% of patients seeking euthanasia still cite loss of dignity 
as a factor). 
201. Bumgardner, supra note 140, at 400; see also Billings & Block, Patient Requests, 
supra note 190, at 2043; Joan Arehart-Treichel, Terminally Ill Choose Fasting Over M.D.­
Assisted Suicide, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2004, at 15. 
202. Meier et al., supra note 173, at 1 197 (indicating that 53% of such patients are 
moved by loss of dignity). 
203. Justice Stevens has acknowledged a dying patient's "interest in dignity, and in 
determining the character of the memories that will survive long after her death." 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 743 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Judge Reinhardt, in his Ninth Circuit opinion later reversed by the Supreme Court, 
remarked: 
A competent terminally ill adult . . .  has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and 
humane death rather than being reduced . . .  to a childlike state of helplessness, diapered, 
sedated, incontinent. How a person dies not only determines the nature of the final period of 
his existence, but in many cases, the enduring memories held by those who love him. 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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There are ways of hastening death (other than traditional PAD) 
that have surfaced over the last decades. Do these "new" forms -
only dimly imagined in 1958 - obviate the need for PAD and is their 
legal and moral status significantly different from PAD? The first new 
form of hastening death is voluntary stopping of eating and drinking 
("VSED"). A patient who rejects all nutrition and hydration will 
expire from dehydration in ten to fourteen days, less if the patient is 
already weakened by an enervating medical condition. With 
appropriate palliative care, the VSED patient will slip into a coma 
within days and will not suffer during the dying process.204 The VSED 
technique certainly smacks of suicide (given the patient's initiation of 
a purposeful course of conduct hastening death) and the health care 
provider's cooperation with the process smacks of assistance to 
suicide. Similar self-destructive conduct by physically healthy persons 
is usually branded as suicide. That is, in most jurisdictions an otherwise 
healthy hunger striker is usually viewed as attempting suicide and is 
deemed to be subject to unwanted but life-sustaining medical 
intervention.205 Nonetheless, when a dying, debilitated patient 
competently decides to forgo further nutrition and hydration, neither 
courts nor health care providers are inclined to intervene.206 On an 
emotional plane, the specter of restraining or force-feeding a dying 
patient is repugnant.207 On a legal plane, the patient is invoking a 
traditional prerogative to resist unwanted medical invasions. Some 
commentators therefore call the VSED approach a "lawful variant" of 
rejecting LSMT.208 Interestingly, a recent survey of nurses in Oregon 
204. See HOEFLER, supra note 112, at 112-23; Ira Byock, Patient refusal of nutrition and 
hydration: Walking the ever-finer line, 12:2 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE (March 
1995) 8, 1 1 .  
205. E.g. , In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984); Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 
623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); see NORMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND 
DYING 26-28 (1987) [hereinafter CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS]; see also KEOWN, supra note 
41, at 229-30. In the case of prisoners initiating hunger strikes, American courts usually 
authorize prison authorities to intervene and salvage the patient. 
206. In the few cases that have arisen, courts have upheld the prerogative of a fatally 
afflicted patient to resist nutrition. See Cantor, Legal Frontiers, supra note 205; Cantor & 
Thomas, supra note 159, at 110-12. 
207. Stephen G. Post, Tube Feeding and Advanced Progressive Dementia, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 36, 38; Cantor, Twenty-five Years after Quinlan, supra note 
3, at 184. 
208. Louise A. Printz, Terminal Dehydration, a Compassionate Treatment, 152 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 697 (1992); Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last 
Resort: A Comparison of Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 278 JAMA 2099 (1997) 
[hereinafter Quill et al., A Comparison]; Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Treatments of Last 
Resort: Choosing the Least Harmful Alternative, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 488, 490-91 
(2000) [hereinafter Quill et al., Choosing the Least Harmful Alternative]. 
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suggests that more patients die there via VSED than by physician­
assisted suicide.209 
A variant of VSED is a technique called terminal sedation. Under 
this technique, deep sedation renders a patient unconscious or 
stuporous until death ensues. This usually occurs toward the end stage 
of a person's dying process. Terminal sedation can take several forms, 
some of which are clearly lawful.210 For example, deep sedation may 
serve as a palliative during withdrawal of life-sustaining medical 
machinery in order to ease the concomitant passing. Or deep sedation 
may be instituted when an egregiously suffering patient is within hours 
or days of death - a point when it is impossible to know whether the 
sedation even hastens death. Terminal sedation becomes more 
controversial when a dying patient capable of surviving for more than 
a few days consents to deep sedation in order to relieve intolerable 
suffering and simultaneously consents to withholding of ANH after 
sedation is administered. The consequence is that death will ensue 
within days either from dehydration or from the underlying disease.211 
From one perspective, a physician who administers the sedation 
and withdraws ANH knowing that the patient will soon die appears to 
be assisting a suicide. Cessation of hydration then seems like a 
gratuitous means to hasten death, as relief of suffering is already 
accomplished by deep sedation. From another perspective, the 
terminal sedation technique is just another form of acceptable 
palliative care212 "a combination of aggressive symptom 
management (sedatives to treat unbearable symptoms) and 
withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy (fluids, nutrition, and other 
treatments)."213 The legal status of terminal sedation is still unclear.214 
If it is lawful, and I think it is, one thing is sure. The physician's 
conduct in initiating deep sedation and then cooperating in the 
rejection of further medical intervention (knowing that the patient will 
die) looks a lot like PAD. Especially when terminal sedation is 
undertaken long before the underlying disease process would 
209. Arehart-Treichel, supra note 201. 
210. For a full explication of terminal sedation and its legality, see Cantor & Thomas, 
supra note 159, at 138-51.  
211. Roger Magnusson describes terminal sedation as a frequent "method of choice" for 
end-stage AIDS patients seeking to hasten their deaths. MAGNUSSON, supra note 81 , at 87; 
see also supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
212. Alexander Morgan Capron, Care of the Dying: Withholding Nutrition, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Oct.-Nov. 1984, at 32-35. 
213. Quill et al., Choosing the Least Harmful Alternative, supra note 208, at 491 .  
214. See Cantor & Thomas, supra note 159, at 142-50. Certainly, when used a t  the end­
stage of disease, a cooperating physician is effectively immune from prosecution. Causation 
could not readily be proved, for the debilitated patient might have died because of the 
underlying disease process rather than the physician's actions. 
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otherwise have taken its toll, this terminal process walks, talks, and 
squawks like PAD. 
Another way of hastening death is to administer analgesics in 
sufficient dosage to accelerate death. As George Thomas and I have 
explained elsewhere,215 the governing principles are found in the law of 
recklessness and justification. A physician is justified in incurring some 
risk of death in order to relieve a patient's unbearable suffering. 
Administering analgesics that risk death but promise relief of intense 
suffering is not criminal so long as reasonable alternative pain-relief 
methods are not available, care is taken in increasing dosages, and the 
dosage only risks causing death.216 We maintain that the criminal law 
prohibits pain relief in a dosage that a physician knows will kill a 
patient, regardless of whether the physician's motive is to relieve 
suffering.217 And a person "knows" that death will ensue if death is 
"certain or practically certain" to follow.218 Yale Kamisar agrees.219 
Other sources, however, have suggested that a physician may 
lawfully administer pain relief in a dosage that the physician knows 
will cause death. Conventional wisdom claims that administration of 
analgesics necessary to relieve suffering is lawful, however great the 
risk, so long as the physician's primary intent is to relieve suffering.220 
215. Cantor & Thomas, supra note 159, at 131-39. 
216. In order to avoid reckless practice, the degree of risk must be proportionate to the 
analgesic relief provided and the physician must have tried less-dangerous analgesics 
previously. Id. at 132-34. "Ethically, strong support exists for gradually increasing medication 
in terminal illness to levels that relieve pain, even if a side effect is to shorten life." Maynard 
et al., Am. Coll. of Physicians, supra note 70, at 955. 
217. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 321·22 
(1957); Cantor & Thomas, supra note 159, at 130-32; Raymond G. Frey, Intention, Foresight, 
and Killing, in INTENDING DEATH 66 (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., 1996); John Harris, The 
Philosophical Case against The Philosophical Case against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA 
EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 36, 39-40 (J. Keown, ed. 1995). 
218. Cantor & Thomas, supra note 159, at 131-32 (referring to Section 210.2 of the 
Model Penal Code); KEOWN, supra note 41, at 27-28 (describing British precedent). 
219. Kamisar, The 'Right to Die, ' supra note 4, at 500. For him, our analysis showing that 
risky analgesics are legal, but that knowingly lethal analgesics are not, helps dispel the 
resemblance between active euthanasia and use of risky analgesics that might hasten death. 
220. That wisdom approves dangerous pain relief so long as the pain relief is necessary 
and the person administering the analgesics primarily intends to relieve suffering rather than 
to kill the patient. KASS, supra note 37, at 37; David Thomasma, Bioethics 13:4 at 14. The 
claim is that the doctrine of double effect ("DOE") can be transposed to end-of-life 
jurisprudence and governs the legality of risky analgesics. Yet the DOE simply does not fit in 
this context. See Timothy E. Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect - A Critique of Its Role 
in End-of-Life Decision Making, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1768 (1997). First, under DOE the 
actor's motivation must solely be to relieve pain. Yet such a pure motivation is seldom 
present when large doses of painkillers are administered. Dutch experience shows that when 
physicians give large doses of painkillers to egregiously suffering patients, almost 40% either 
explicitly intend to shorten life or partly intend to shorten life. KEOWN, supra note 41, at 95 
(noting that mixed intention is perfectly natural when the physician knows that only death 
will effectively end the suffering). American experience also discloses some underground 
practice of physicians administering analgesics with intent to end the patient's suffering by 
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The Supreme Court seemingly legitimized this misguided conventional 
wisdom about aggressive pain relief in Washington v. Glucksberg,221 
where five Justices suggested that a knowingly lethal pain relief dosage 
would be legally tolerable so long as the administering person 
intended to relieve suffering rather than cause death.222 This 
suggestion from members of the Court prompted some commentators 
to herald an emerging constitutional "right to be free of unnecessary 
pain and suffering at the end of life."223 
But if an intolerably suffering, competent patient is in fact entitled 
to receive an analgesic in dosage known to be fatal, then the 
traditional legal prohibition of PAD has been significantly eroded. 
Relief of suffering has never provided an adequate justification for 
killing a human in Anglo-American law. Traditional criminal law 
simply does not let the presence of extreme suffering by the victim and 
a merciful motive or intention by the perpetrator serve as a legal 
excuse or justification for knowingly killing a person. A knowing 
killing has always been treated as unlawful no matter how severe the 
victim's suffering, how near his death, how firm his request for death, 
or how motivated the killer is by a desire to relieve suffering.224 
Administering a drug dosage that is known to be lethal is an unlawful 
killing whether the actor intends to relieve suffering, intends to cause 
ending the patient's life. MAGNUSSON, supra note 81, at 192-94; Meier et al., supra note 173; 
Robertson, supra note 80, at 334; Marcia Angell, No One Trusts the Dying, WASH. POST, 
July 7, 1997, at A19 [hereinafter Angell, No One Trusts the Dying]; Thomas A. Preston, 
Killing Pain, Ending Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at 27. Second, under DDE, the licit 
justification (here, pain relief) must be proportionate to the supposedly unwanted, but risked 
evil (suppressing respiration and killing the patient). However, the criminal law says that a 
purpose to relieve suffering is not a sufficient justification for a killing. The bottom line is 
that a physician's intention to relieve suffering does not make it lawful to administer 
analgesics in dosage that is known to be lethal. 
221. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
222. Several parties in briefs or oral argument contended that administration of 
necessary pain relief would be lawful even if it would certainly cause death. Language in the 
opinions of Justices Souter, Stevens, O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg seemed to say that a 
suffering patient would be entitled to pain relief "as needed" even if the pain relief would 
certainly cause death. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 780-81 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 750-52 
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 791 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). See Cantor, Glucksberg, supra note 32, at 307-09, 313. 
223. Pratt, supra note 80, at 223. See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: Physician­
Assisted Suicide and the Constitution, 82 MINN. L. REV. 965, 968 (1998); Robert A. Burt, The 
Supreme Court Speaks - Not Assisted Suicide But a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997); Susan Adler Channick, The Myth of A utonomy at the 
End-of-Life: Questioning the Paradigm of Rights, 44 VILL. L. REV. 577, 606 (1999); 
Robertson, supra note 80, at 329, 338; Alexander Morgan Capron, Death and the Court, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 25, 28. 
224. WILLIAMS, supra note 217, at 319; Cantor, Glucksberg, supra note 32, at 309; John 
Harris, The Philosophical Case Against the Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in 
Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical, and Legal Perspectives 36, 39-40 (J. Keown ed. 
1995). 
1838 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102: 1793 
death, or intends to cause death in order to relieve suffering. So if the 
administration of pain relief in dosage known to be lethal is legally 
protected conduct, precious little difference exists between this 
currently condoned form of hastening death and forms of PAD like 
providing a poison or injecting a lethal substance that the criminal law 
condemns. 
Despite the tensions or inconsistency between accepted "new" 
ways of hastening death and the current ban on PAD, why not 
maintain the legal status quo concerning physician conduct toward 
competent patients seeking to hasten death? The status quo ostensibly 
offers benefits without major costs. Although both PAS and voluntary 
active euthanasia are unlawful, some intrepid physicians still "do the 
right thing" in compelling cases. These intrepid doctors know that any 
prosecution against them will likely be unavailing where the case truly 
involves a patient's consent and egregious circumstances of suffering 
or indignity.225 Of course, no physician wants the burdens of defending 
a criminal charge, so a physician cooperating with a request for PAD 
must be intrepid. Because most physicians are deterred from PAD, 
hazards of abuse or of unsavory extensions are minimized. And 
without legalization of PAD, law on the books will continue to 
reinforce the sanctity of life by prohibiting almost all killings, even 
those motivated by mercy toward suffering people. Formal law will 
continue to communicate its symbolic message that killing a fellow 
human is almost always forbidden. 
It also turns out that within the status quo a variety of legal or 
arguably legal ways exist for a competent, suffering patient to hasten 
death.226 Unassisted suicide is lawful and new methods are constantly 
being invented to accomplish that end in a reliable, quick, and non­
messy fashion.227 Most people are capable of killing themselves; they 
tum to physician assistance only because of fear of a messy botched 
attempt.228 As previously described, VSED coupled with rejection of 
ANH offers a competent, suffering patient a relatively placid way to 
die within ten to fourteen days. Terminal sedation (including 
withholding of ANH) may be an option for an agitated or tortured 
225. Even the brash Dr. Kevorkian was acquitted of assisting suicide three times before 
being convicted of homicide after flaunting a video tape of him giving a lethal injection to a 
patient. Adam Liptak, Rights and Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2003, at A24; see also 
Browne, supra note 100, at 37 (describing the ways in which mercy killers often avoid 
punishment). 
226. See supra notes 204-223 and accompanying text. 
227. See Suicide Technologies: Exit This Way, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2001, at 69. 
(describing suicide methods promoted by the Nu Tech coalition, supporters of death with 
dignity who seek to develop painless, quick, and reliable suicide methods. Currently, they 
favor a face mask attached to a plastic canister which will emit sodium hydroxide [turning 
the air to carbon dioxide] or a plastic bag containing helium which will quickly displace air). 
228. Billings & Block, Patient Requests, supra note 190, at 2040. 
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patient and, as described, will ensure a peaceful death within fourteen 
days. Subject to certain conditions, risky analgesics are available which 
might end suffering either by successful palliation or by accelerating a 
patient's death. Moreover, the perception exists in some medical 
circles that a physician may administer a large dose of painkillers that 
the physician knows will cause death, so long as the physician 
primarily intends to end suffering. Finally, if a suffering patient has 
deteriorated to the point of machine dependence, then that patient can 
dictate removal of LSMT. 
The status quo, though, has significant detriments. Most obvious is 
the capriciousness that determines whether a patient can engineer a 
reasonably dignified death. Despite the criminal-law prohibition, some 
physicians do covertly assist in suicide.229 But whether any particular 
patient has access to such a physician is largely a function of chance. 
Also, despite the unresolved status of analgesics in dosage known to 
be lethal,230 some compassionate physicians have in practice always 
ended some lives with overdoses of morphine or other painkillers.231 
Again, access to such relief is a function of chance. Death-hastening 
practice, other than removal of life support, is "secret and 
unpredictable, depending more on doctors' courage and compassion 
than on patients' needs and wishes."232 Do we really want a regulatory 
regime that " 'covertly permits some particularly compassionate and 
courageous physicians to violate the law in fear and trembling' "233 
while the average suffering patient must contend with the average 
physician who will not accommodate even an egregiously suffering 
patient's wish to hasten death? 
Putting capriciousness aside - and that's not an easy thing to do 
- what other costs attach to retaining the status quo and its ostensible 
prohibition of PAD? In 1958, Yale Kamisar thought that the cost of 
the status quo was only to allow "some cancer victim to suffer a little 
229. "Many doctors are willing to prescribe potentially lethal painkillers, even under 
current restrictions, knowing that it is extremely unlikely they will ever be indicted, much 
less tried or convicted." Pratt, supra note 80, at 233. 
230. See, supra notes 215-220 and accompanying text. George Thomas, Yale Kamisar, 
and I all contend that such conduct is unlawful euthanasia, but some Supreme Court justices 
have hinted that the practice might be a constitutionally mandated option for an intractably 
suffering patient. Supra note 222. 
231. MAGNUSSON, supra note 81, at 88-89, 192-94, 197; J. Andrew Billings & Susan D .  
Block, Slow Euthanasia, 12 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 21 (WINTER 1996); Angell, No One Trusts 
the Dying, supra note 220, at Al9; Thomas A. Preston, Killing Pain, Ending Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1 ,  1984, at A27. The willingness of some British doctors to administer a humane 
overdose of morphine was noted in Great Britain's first debate about voluntary active 
euthanasia in 1936. Williams, supra note 147, at 146. 
232. Angell, No One Trusts the Dying, supra note 220, at A19. 
233. Kamisar, PAS: The Problems Presented, supra note 4, at 1 126 (quoting John D. 
Arras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH & POL'Y 361, 365 
(1997)) (emphasis in original). 
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longer"234 or to force some patient who didn't really want to survive to 
linger on "for awhile."235 Today, the availability of probably legal 
methods of hastening death such as VSED and terminal sedation 
potentially assures that a competent patient can escape suffering via 
sedation and limit the period of lingering on to approximately 
fourteen days.236 
The problem is that many people - myself included - would 
regard the days of lingering helplessly and insensately as a repulsive 
dying process.237 A formerly vital individual being maintained for days 
or weeks in a permanently insentient state is indeed undignified in 
some measure. True, the sedated or comatose person might not be 
aware of the demeaning state or the surrounding death watch. Still, 
some dying persons averse to indignity would much prefer prompt 
access to PAD rather than lying helplessly and insensately for days or 
weeks before passing. 
While distasteful to some, a period of insensate lingering (usually 
lasting a maximum of seven to fourteen days) does not violate intrinsic 
human dignity. Lying in deep sedation for such a finite period does not 
seem nearly as inhumane or demeaning as protracted unconsciousness 
for months or even years. There is even a similarity between a 
temporary state of deep sedation and a natural dying process. "In 
dying patients, coma may act as a natural form of anesthesia so that 
the hours or days before death are devoid of pain, fear, or suffering. 
[This disease induced condition] allows death to occur naturally and 
peacefully."238 There is, as noted, some affront to self-determination, 
as some people would prefer a prompt death over lingering insensate 
for days. Yet a modest terminal period in deep sedation is not so 
demeaning as to be deemed intrinsically inhumane and can even be 
regarded as securing "a modicum of dignity at death."239 Some people 
consider it a "good or very good death" when a loved one withdraws 
from dialysis and lingers on for an average of eight days.240 
Oddly, the period of lingering in an undignified state during VSED 
or terminal sedation might not be any longer than if PAD were 
234. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views, supra note 1, at 1041. 
235. Id. at 977. 
236. The assurance is only potential because, until many more patients and doctors 
know and accept these options, their availability will remain capricious. 
237. "Any protracted period of helpless, insensate lingering is anathema to people 
seeking a dignified passing." Cantor, supra note 32, at 304. 
238. Brief of Amicus Curiae Choice in Dying at 16, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702 (1997) (No. 96-1 10). 
239. George P. Smith II, Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care: Revalidating a Right to a 
Good Death, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 382, 383 (1998). 
240. For part of those eight days the patient may be conscious and then slip into a coma. 
Cohen et al., supra note 102, at 2116-17. 
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legalized. Any acceptable statutory scheme for legalized PAD would 
include a mandatory waiting period of at least seven to fourteen days. 
The competent patient, therefore, might not be better off with 
legalized PAD - except, of course, that legalized PAD would be 
widely, not capriciously, available. 
CONCLUSION 
As a practical matter, legalized PAD would probably not offer 
more expeditious relief to a competent, egregiously suffering patient 
than currently legal modes of hastening death. And once the 
availability of such unorthodox yet legal modes of dying becomes 
more widely known, the current capriciousness of end-of-life medical 
practice might be substantially reduced. Physicians will presumably 
come to understand the array of options legally available for hastening 
death. So maintenance of the status quo still looks like the best course, 
even if one believes (as I do) that legalized PAD would not prompt 
more abuse of vulnerable, dying patients or an erosion of medical 
mores. In the status quo, competent patients have ways to hasten 
death painlessly while society maintains its putative message that 
almost all killing of human beings is anathema. 
My main problem is the hypocrisy of pretending that contemporary 
American society truly bars PAD. A doctor who pulls the plug at the 
patient's behest knowing that the intolerably suffering patient will 
promptly die is performing a legal mercy killing. (And it could not be 
any other way because otherwise physicians would have to continue 
pumping fluids and medications until the last gasp of a tortured, 
moribund person). A physician who acquiesces in a competent 
patient's election of VSED and who provides palliative care while the 
patient dies of dehydration is, quite properly, assisting a suicide. A 
physician who administers deep sedation to render a dying patient 
senseless, and who then acquiesces in the patient's prior decision to 
reject ANH is, in a meaningful sense, performing voluntary euthanasia 
even if it may be impossible to prove that the sedation had a causal 
connection to the patient's death. And while a physician whose pain­
relief administration merely risks the suffering patient's death is not 
performing a killing, a physician who administers pain relief in a 
known lethal dosage is performing euthanasia.241 
241. We know that even under the current legal framework such actions are not 
uncommon. See supra note 231. "The imperatives of pain control and palliation can disguise 
the fact that a patient is being intentionally drugged to death" via I.V. painkillers. 
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Forty-five years ago Yale Kamisar wrote the most eloquent, 
comprehensive, honest, and persuasive critique of PAD ever 
written.242 Kamisar fixed the parameters of subsequent debate and his 
position opposing legalization of PAD has ostensibly prevailed. 
Assisted suicide is unlawful except in Oregon and euthanasia is 
everywhere forbidden in the United States. Yet Kamisar could not 
then have anticipated the phenomenon that alternative modes of 
hastening death would become acceptable - modes that belie the 
notion of a societal ban on PAD. Kamisar won the battle but lost the 
war. And so it should have been. For competent, fatally afflicted 
persons should have the option of hastening death in the face of 
intolerable suffering or indignity. Likewise for conscientious 
surrogates acting on behalf of now-incompetent, fatally stricken wards. 
242. Second place goes to the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law. 
